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MONITORING BEHAVIOR: UNIVERSITIES,
NONPROFITS, PATENTS, AND
LITIGATION
Teo Firpo & Michael S. Mireles*
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the confluence of two important issues concerning
patent law. The two issues are the merits of the debate concerning the sup-
posed “patent troll” crisis and the increased patenting and licensing of uni-
versity and other nonprofit inventions, including the litigation of those
patents.
First, there is a debate in the literature concerning the presence and scope
of the problem concerning so-called “patent trolls.”  To some, supposed
“patent troll” behavior is ordinary litigation behavior, and to others, it
points to problems with the patent litigation system.  Indeed, some may
argue that the benefits of “patent trolls” may outweigh the negatives; how-
ever, the literature is not clear on an answer to that question.  The literature
does point to certain factors which indicate when a patent holder may be
abusing the system and behaving as a “troll.”  This paper provides a review
and analysis of some important patent enforcement literature.
Second, there is a substantial amount of literature concerning the patent-
ing and licensing by universities and other nonprofits since passage of the
Bayh-Dole Act in 1980. The Bayh-Dole Act allows universities and other
nonprofits to patent government funded invention. The literature points to
issues that may arise concerning university patent related activity, including
some efforts by universities to lobby to protect their interests. This paper
provides a review and analysis of some of that literature.
Finally, this paper analyzes data from multiple sources at the confluence
of those two issues, asking whether universities and other nonprofits are
behaving similarly to so-called “patent trolls.” Our research finds that in
some instances universities and nonprofits may share some characteristics
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similar to “patent trolls.” However, while we believe that casting a particu-
lar narrative over the data is relatively dangerous, there is cause for con-
cern in the future. There are several factors that may make it more likely
that universities and nonprofits will engage in additional litigation in the
future, including perhaps abusive litigation practices resembling so-called
“patent trolls.” Indeed, several factors may place increased pressure on
universities and nonprofits to find ways to monetize their patents. For ex-
ample, the U.S. government appears to desire to cut research funding to
universities, and universities will be searching for additional revenue
streams. Moreover, most technology transfer offices fail to generate enough
revenue to sustain themselves and will likely push for increased patenting,
licensing, and even litigating to fund their operations. And, universities ap-
pear to be changing their tenure policies to encourage commercialization
activities. As universities and their technology transfer offices search for
funding, they may believe that commercialization and patent enforcement
is the answer. We conclude that university and nonprofit litigation should
be carefully monitored in the future, including patent litigation by aca-
demic and research institutions based outside the United States.
2018] Monitoring Behavior 507
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I. INTRODUCTION
THIS paper examines the confluence of two of the most controver-sial and important issues concerning intellectual property law inthe United States.1 The first issue is the so-called “patent troll”
phenomenon.2 The second issue is the rise of university and non-profit
patenting.3 Specifically, this paper analyzes empirical data collected from
multiple sources, including the Stanford Nonpracticing Entity Database,
concerning litigation by universities and non-profits.4 The paper presents
the data by examining the question of whether universities and non-prof-
its are engaging in behavior that mirrors supposed patent trolls, including
licensing patents to so-called patent trolls.5
For the last decade, policymakers and scholars have made proposals
and debated the merits of patent trolls.6 Indeed, the debate has ranged
from who is a so-called patent troll to whether patent trolls exist and the
merits of patent trolls.7 From the White House to Congress to the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), proposals and studies addressing the issue
have been published.8 Indeed, many court decisions are arguably directed
to solve the patent troll problem, even as some argue that a problem does
1. For an interesting discussion of the patent troll issue in Europe, see Stefania Fusco,
Markets and Patent Enforcement: A Comparative Investigation of Non-Practicing Entities in
the United States and Europe, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 439 (2014).
2. See, e.g., Brian L. Frye, IP as Metaphor, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 735, 735 (2015) (discuss-
ing the troll metaphor); Kristen Osenga, Debugging Software’s Schemas, 82 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1832, 1846 (2014) (discussing cognitive biases relating to so-called trolls).
3. See generally Michael S. Mireles, Jr., States as Innovation System Laboratories: Cal-
ifornia, Patents, and Stem Cell Technology, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1133 (2006) [hereinafter
Mireles, States as Innovation System Laboratories].
4. Most universities are also non-profits. For purposes of this article, the term “non-
profits” is used to describe non-university and non-university related non-profits.
5. Commentators have called for additional research on university behavior in patent
litigations. See Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The
Effects of Patent Monetization Entities, 17 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 50 (2013). Professors
Robert P. Merges and Mark A. Lemley identified the line-drawing problem with respect to
rent-seeking behavior by universities specifically. See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities
Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 612 (2008) [hereinaf-
ter Lemley, Trolls] (“[A] troll is as [a] troll does. Universities will sometimes be bad actors.
So will non-manufacturing patent owners. So will manufacturing patent owners.”); Robert
P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1610–12 (2009) [hereinafter Merges, Trouble with Trolls].
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY: AN FTC
STUDY (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entity-
activity-ftc-study/p131203_patent_assertion_entity_activity_an_ftc_study_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YQV8-RYC8] [hereinafter FTC PAE REPORT]; Press Release, White House,
FACT SHEET: White House Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues (June 4, 2014), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-
tech-patent-issues [https://perma.cc/TVY7-4V7J] (describing five executive actions and
seven legislative recommendations to address patent assertion entities); U.S. GOV’T AC-
COUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS
THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUAL-
ITY (2013) [hereinafter 2013 GAO REPORT].
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not exist.9
Since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, which allows universi-
ties and non-profits to patent government funded inventions, university
patenting has been on the rise.10 To some, this rise in patenting may result
in unintended consequences, such as shifting norms at universities from
basic research to applied research, to an increase in patents on fundamen-
tal technologies leading to the development of patent thickets or an an-
ticommons.11 Moreover, there are concerns with access to university
created inventions—particularly those funded by the public.12 Universi-
ties have also successfully lobbied for patent legislation that preserves a
privileged status in securing and asserting patents against others.13 Fur-
thermore, there are several recent examples of cases brought by universi-
ties that have merited the application of the moniker patent troll by the
press.14 One such case involves Boston University. Boston University
sued more than thirty defendants, including Apple, for infringing a late-
term patent covering LED technology.15 Most of the suits settled in
2014.16
One of the most recent proposals to address the supposed “trolling”
problem is from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and targets
behavior at the confluence of the patent troll debate and university and
non-profit litigation.17 Around the fall of 2016, the EFF proposed its Re-
claim Invention Program.18 The program was designed to target univer-
sity litigation behavior and address the problem of universities licensing
their inventions to supposed patent trolls.19 The program has two basic
prongs20: The first is to use grass roots activism to persuade universities to
engage in certain behavior, including not licensing to so-called patent
trolls.21 The second is to push model state legislation that would penalize
public universities that license to so-called patent trolls.22 Indeed, a legis-
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See Walter D. Valdivia, Patent Infringement Suits Have a Reputational Cost for
Universities, BROOKINGS (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2015/
11/10/patent-infringement-suits-have-a-reputational-cost-for-universities-2/ [https://
perma.cc/3LRG-DMJB] (describing lawsuits brought by universities); John Koetsier, Con-
gratulations, Boston University, You’re Now a Patent Troll, VENTUREBEAT (July 3, 2013,
12:17 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2013/07/03/congratulations-boston-university-youre-
now-a-patent-troll/amp/ [https://perma.cc/A4MX-C8FT].
15. See Rich Barlow, Companies Agree to Pay to Settle Patent Infringement Suit, BU
TODAY (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.bu.edu/today/2014/companies-agree-to-pay-licensing-
fees-to-settle-patent-infringement-suit/ [https://perma.cc/N3B3-ZQNA].
16. See id.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part IV.
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lator in the state of Maryland introduced such legislation.23
The EFF’s program resulted in a response from noted property rights
scholar Richard Epstein in Fortune magazine.24 Professor Epstein essen-
tially critiqued the EFF’s proposal by arguing, in part, that there is not
any empirical evidence that universities are misbehaving.25 This paper
provides information to assess and inform the debate on the behavior of
universities and non-profits, and their licensees, in patent litigation. To
put it bluntly, are universities, non-profits, and their licensees engaged in
patent troll behavior?
Some studies have attempted to quantify the amount of university liti-
gation and publish data concerning that litigation.26 This study is one of
the first to use the Stanford Nonpracticing Entity Litigation Dataset
(Stanford NPE Dataset) to target university and non-profit litigation, and
there appears to be more university and non-profit litigation than found
in earlier studies.
Moreover, some of this behavior appears to mimic certain types of
“troll” behavior.27 For example, some variables used to predict “opportu-
nistic” or trolling behavior appear in our dataset of university and non-
profit actors.28 Moreover, the characteristics of some of the patents also
seem to be similar to trolling type patents.29 However, some of this be-
havior may be characterized as common strategic litigation behavior,
which may, as some scholars have argued, point to larger issues within the
patent system itself.30 Notably, a significant number of the litigated pat-
ents in the dataset are publicly funded.31 Moreover, numerous universi-
ties are land-grant universities and public universities.32 Thus, there are
numerous universities that are receiving substantial public support with
publicly funded inventions and are mimicking, in some respects, trolling
behavior.33 Additionally, foreign universities are patenting at a relatively
high number and are engaging in litigation that bears some similarity to
trolling behavior as well.34
While casting a particular narrative over this data is relatively danger-
ous, we believe that there is cause for concern in the future. There are
several factors which may make it more likely that universities and non-
profits will engage in additional litigation in the future, including, per-
haps, abusive litigation practices resembling so-called patent trolls.35 In-
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. See infra Part V.
27. See infra Part V.
28. See infra Part V.
29. See infra Part V.
30. See infra Part V.
31. See infra Part V.
32. See infra Part V.
33. See infra Part V.
34. See infra Part V.
35. See infra Part IV.
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deed, the factors may place increased pressure on universities and non-
profits to find ways to monetize their patents.36 For example, the U.S.
government appears to desire to cut research funding to universities.37
Universities will be searching for additional revenue streams.38 Moreo-
ver, most technology transfer offices fail to generate enough revenue to
sustain themselves and will likely push for more increased patenting and
licensing to fund their operations.39 And, universities appear to be chang-
ing their tenure policies to encourage commercialization activities.40 As
universities and their technology transfer offices search for funding, they
may believe that commercialization is the answer. Thus, university and
non-profit litigation should be carefully monitored in the future.
This article has six parts: (I) Introduction; (II) The Patent Troll Issue;
(III) University and Nonprofit Patenting and Litigation; (IV) Reasons for
Concern, the EFF, and Richard Epstein; (V) Data; and (VI) Conclusion.
Part II discusses the patent troll issue. Part III analyzes university and
non-profit patent litigation. Part IV sets forth reasons for concern for the
future and the controversy between the EFF and Professor Richard Ep-
stein. Part V discusses the data collected based on the Stanford NPE
Database, including methodology, and analyzes the data. Part VI is a
conclusion.
II. THE PATENT TROLL ISSUE
This portion of the article analyzes the patent troll issue, including dis-
cussing the definitional problem of who exactly is a supposed troll.41 This
Part also reviews the Stanford NPE Dataset and additional issues in the
literature concerning patent trolls.42
A. PATENT TROLLS AND THE DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM
The term patent troll and the related terms “non-practicing entity” and
“patent assertion entity” are used to describe a certain class of patent
holders who assert patents through demand letters and litigation. How-
ever, the question of who exactly is a patent troll is not entirely clear.
Some appear to have a broad definition and others a much narrower defi-
nition. Some appear to believe the term should not be used at all.
36. See infra Part IV.
37. See infra Part IV.
38. See infra Part IV.
39. See infra Part IV.
40. See infra Part IV.
41. Professor Christopher Cotropia has stated, “Patent trolls are the targets of the
current patent reform movement. One of the difficulties that has plagued the push for
change, however, is a definitional one—what exactly is a patent troll?” See Christopher A.
Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of the Patent Troll, 12 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 52, 56 (2009) [hereinafter Cotropia, Individual Inventor] (footnotes omitted).
42. The troll label has been used in the trademark and copyright context. See, e.g.,
Michael S. Mireles, Trademark Trolls: A Problem in the United States?, 18 CHAP. L. REV.
815, 815–16 (2015); Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses, 85
U. COLO. L. REV. 53, 53 (2014).
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The term patent troll is used to identify an entity that essentially acted
as the proverbial troll under the bridge.43 The troll taxes people who use
the bridge even though the troll did not build the bridge. The patent troll
is basically an entity who does not practice the patented invention, or
perhaps did not invest in developing the invention, but seeks to assert
that patent against others through either demand letters or litigation.44
Based on the definition of what a troll is, the assumption is that if one is a
troll then one is a “bad” actor.45 The implicit assertion is that the troll
contributes nothing to society and extracts high costs in the form of im-
peding innovation and pushing up costs for consumers for goods and ser-
vices covered by patents.46 Specifically, this activity could have a
deleterious effect on start-ups, small firms, and entrepreneurs by prevent-
ing or delaying new entrants to markets.47 Practicing entity resources,
such as personnel time, could be channeled toward litigation activity and
not at productive tasks, including inventive work.48 Notably, there was a
belief that entities engaging in “troll-like” behavior were a new phenome-
non, but scholars have shown that entities similar to the current trolls
existed in the nineteenth century.49
That said, there are arguments that a so-called patent troll is not always
a bad actor. On the question of the merits of patent trolls, even though
the entity asserting the patent perhaps did not contribute to the develop-
43. The patent troll label has been credited to Peter Detkin, Anne Gundlefinger, and
Mark Davis. See Joff Wild, The Real Inventors of the Term “Patent Troll” Revealed, IAM:
BLOG (Aug.22, 2008), http://www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=cff2afd3-c24e-42e5-
aa68-a4b4e7524177 [Perma link unavailable].
44. See Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against
Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 164 (2006) (“[A] pat-
ent troll is an entity that neither develops novel technologies nor uses those technologies to
provide goods or services to the market . . . [and] acquires patents for the sole purpose of
using them to obtain a revenue stream from a firm that engages in activities arguably fall-
ing within the scope of the patent.”).
45. The FTC notes that “a label like ‘patent troll’ is unhelpful because it invites pre-
judgment about the societal impact of patent assertion activity without an understanding of
the underlying business model that fuels such activity.” FTC PAE REPORT, supra note 8, at
17.
46. The harm from PAEs could also include “keeping off the market products that
would otherwise have been introduced or by causing a whole industry to pick an inferior
technology.” See Fiona M. Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, 79
ANTITRUST L.J. 463, 494–95 (2014).
47. FTC PAE REPORT, supra note 8, at 24–25; Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent
Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 465 (2014) [hereinafter Chien, Startups] (“The charac-
teristics of small companies can make it harder to absorb a PAE demand—40% of small
companies that received a demand and responded to the survey . . . reported a ‘significant
operational impact’: delayed hiring or achievement of another milestone, change in the
product, a pivot in business strategy, a shut-down business line or the entire business, and/
or lost valuation.”).
48. FTC PAE REPORT, supra note 8, at 9.
49. See generally B. Zorina Khan, Trolls and Other Patent Inventions: Economic His-
tory and the Patent Controversy in the Twenty-First Century (Hoover Inst. Working Grp. on
Intellectual Prop., Innovation, and Prosperity, Working Paper No. 13001), https://
sls.gmu.edu/cpip/wp-content/uploads/sites/31/2013/09/Khan-Zorina-Patent-Controversy-in-
the-21st-Century.pdf [https://perma.cc/NB9M-RKZ6]; Adam Mossoff, Patent Licensing
and Secondary Markets in the Nineteenth Century, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 959 (2015).
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ment of the underlying patented invention or practice it, there was an
inventor of the patented invention. One of the counter-arguments for
patent trolls is that they may help the ultimate inventor recoup some
costs of invention and, thus, the patent troll helps the patent system work
for its intended purpose—to incentivize invention.50 Additionally, others
argue that some entities that exhibit characteristics of trolls may also help
find commercialization partners.51 Basically, an entity may send out de-
mand letters that theoretically could lead to a partner who may be inter-
ested in commercializing the invention. However, this theory may not
work well because the potential partner may already practice the inven-
tion, which is the basis of the claim in the demand letter. This is known as
the ex post and ex ante issue.52 If the invention is in practice, then the
litigation demand is essentially ex post and more likely harms innovation,
particularly if very little funding is returned to the inventor. As Professor
Robert Merges has emphasized, the patent system must be tied to inno-
vation and not merely embody untethered rent-seeking.53 Importantly,
Professor Brian Love found that “NPEs . . . assert[ ] their patents rela-
tively late in the patent term and frequently continue to litigate their pat-
ents to expiration.”54 This finding supports the theory that NPEs may “lie
in wait” for practicing entities to commercialize technology and then as-
sert their patents.55
50. See Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 1, 96 (2012) [hereinafter Feldman & Ewing, Giants] (“In this world of imperfections,
mass aggregators may provide a market mechanism for the forgotten inventor whose inno-
vations are in use every day but who remains uncompensated.”); Robin Feldman & Mark
A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing Demands Mean Innovation?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 137, 142
(2015) [hereinafter Feldman & Lemley, Demands] (“[T]he patent holder has properly con-
tributed to learning and dissemination by publishing its ideas in the form of a patent, and
the product company has simply taken the idea from the patent’s disclosure. The patent
troll, therefore, would be operating as a tax collector to facilitate the transfer of an appro-
priate payment to the person who gave the idea to the world.”). Professors Feldman and
Lemley dispute this narrative by arguing that disclosures tend not to be adequate; fast-
moving technologies are less likely to have products match claims; and independent inven-
tion, not copying, is predominantly occurring. Feldman & Lemley, Demands, supra.
51. See Feldman & Ewing, Giants, supra note 50, at 98 (“In addition to the possibility
of compensating forgotten inventors, one could argue that mass aggregators serve as a
form of efficient middle man, a market intermediary who helps patents find their way to
those who would exploit them to create new products.”); Feldman & Lemley, Demands,
supra note 50, at 141 (“And if the inventor is not in a position to commercialize the inven-
tion at all, in theory, patents can serve as a mechanism that allows the inventor to provide
her new idea to someone who can make use of it.”).
52. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NO-
TICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 32–72 (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-and-remedies-
competition-report-federal-trade/110307patentreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/73JS-RX5K]
[hereinafter FTC MARKETPLACE REPORT].
53. See Merges, Trouble with Trolls, supra note 5, at 1599–1600.
54. See Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent
Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309,
1312 (2013) [hereinafter Love, Timing] (“I find that the average product-company patent
has been shelved by its owner before the average NPE patent has even been asserted.”).
55. See Merges, Trouble with Trolls, supra note 5, at 1590–91 (“Typically, the troll
waits until a technology is fully entrenched before scouting around for patents to acquire
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If the invention is not in practice when the demand letter is sent, then
this is ex ante, which may aid innovation.56 Additionally, patent trolls may
provide expertise that some types of inventors do not have.57 They are
essentially specialized market players that have experience licensing pat-
ents.58 This may aid the transfer of patented technology to entities that
may need that technology to innovate and do not desire to independently
develop a non-infringing substitute for that technology.59 Patent trolls
may also have access to funding to litigate cases.60 Moreover, if mass ag-
gregators are considered patent trolls, then patent trolls may provide pat-
ent licenses to companies that need a bargaining chip against other patent
asserters or a package of patents covering a technology.61 One particular
problem with aggregators is that if they assert numerous patents, investi-
gating and analyzing each claim may be more expensive than taking a
license.62
“NPEs and PAEs may [also] help to create a stable and efficient mar-
ketplace for patents to be bought and sold, thereby creating liquidity in
patents as corporate assets and reallocating litigation risk to parties better
able to absorb it.”63 NPEs can also avoid royalty stacking problems by
collecting patents in portfolios.64 NPEs may also reduce the probability of
a patent thicket by “searching, monitoring, and screening complementary
technologies,” including “weed[ing] out bad quality patents caused by
or asserting the patents it holds. Again, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with this strat-
egy unless the patents at issue do not represent a true innovation.”).
56. FTC MARKETPLACE REPORT, supra note 52, at 8.
57. See also Feldman & Ewing, Giants, supra note 50, at 98 (“Inventors may not have
the capital, expertise, or other necessary capacity to manufacture products.”).
58. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 COR-
NELL L. REV. 387, 390 (2014) [hereinafter Bessen & Meurer, Costs] (“Some inventors lack
the resources and expertise needed to successfully license their technologies.”).
59. See FTC MARKETPLACE REPORT, supra note 52, at 8.
60. 2013 GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 35 (“Representatives from a university we
spoke with also said universities look to outside entities, such as PMEs, to finance patent
infringement litigation because universities cannot cover the up-front costs of filing a law-
suit.”). Professor David L. Schwartz has found that universities are also using contingency
fee arrangements with patent litigation suits. See David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contin-
gent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 376 (2012) (“[Technol-
ogy Transfer Offices] often lack the financial resources to pay hourly billing patent
litigators [and c]ontingent representation solves that problem.”).
61. See also Feldman & Ewing, Giants, supra note 50, at 102–04 (“When a company is
sued for infringement or must enter into a negotiation to acquire rights from another en-
tity, the company can shop for and acquire precisely the patents that could present a
counter threat to the opposing party. . . . This type of strategy could ensure that a company
has the comfortable freedom to operate vis-a`-vis its competitors without worrying about
patent suits that are the scourge of the modern patent world.”).
62. See Robin Feldman, The Pace of Change: Non-Practicing Entities and the Shifting
Legal Landscape, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 635, 637 (2015) [hereinafter Feldman, Pace of Change].
63. FTC PAE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26–27. However, Professor Robert P. Merges
notes that “[n]ot all arbitrage exchange is in fact efficient and socially desirable” and pro-
vides the example of blackmail. See Merges, Trouble with Trolls, supra note 5, at 1588.
64. See Jiaqing “Jack” Lu, The Economics and Controversies of Nonpracticing Entities
(NPES): How NPES and Defensive Patent Aggregators Will Change the License Market, 47
LES NOUVELLES 55, 60 (2012).
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patent proliferation.”65
Moreover, Professors John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, and Joshua
Walker found substantial overlap between the most valuable and most
litigated patents—importantly, the most litigated patents are “dispropor-
tionately owned by nonpracticing entities.”66 Thus, according to the au-
thors, NPEs may deserve “more respect than the current patent system
(and certainly patent reformers) gives them.”67
Some entities that do not practice a patented invention but may assert
that patent against others may not be considered patent trolls. On closer
examination, for example, many believe that universities are not trolls
even though they are unlikely to practice the invention. Moreover, some
entities that are practicing entities may have patents that they do not
practice but may assert them against others.68 Relatedly, some practicing
entities may license to non-practicing entities to assert patents that the
practicing entities do not practice against competitors to raise their costs
of doing business.69 Given the level of nuance, and perhaps for strategic
reasons, the definition of a troll has changed over the years. Some defini-
tions began to refer to a broad class of entities called “Non-practicing
Entities” or “NPEs” for short. This group of entities included universities,
for example. And, some began to refer to “Patent Assertion Entities” or
“PAEs.” PAEs exist solely to assert patents.70 Another term used in the
literature is a “Patent Monetization Entity” or “PME,” which appears to
be similar to a PAE.71
Professor Lemley and Douglas Melamed further refer to certain enti-
ties who essentially exist to extract “nuisance type settlements” from
65. Id. at 61.
66. John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on
Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009)
[hereinafter Extreme Value].
67. Id. at 29.
68. See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 301 (2010)
[hereinafter Chien, Arms Race] (“Practicing companies have used their once-defensive pat-
ents to selectively sue in areas in where they no longer or never did operate, using the same
tactics as patent-assertion entities.”).
69. See Fiona M. Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, 79 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 463, 494 (2014) [hereinafter Scott Morton & Shapiro, Strategic] (“We consider
the hybrid PAE model to be the most troubling. We have in mind a hybrid PAE that is
using outsized threats to obtain payments in excess of reasonable royalties, while working
with a practicing entity that has its own incentive to raise its rivals’ costs.”).
70. The FTC PAE Report defines a patent assertion entity as
a firm that primarily acquires patents and seeks to generate revenue by as-
serting them against accused infringers. . . . PAE business models focus on
asserting patents that the firm has acquired from third parties, rather than
obtained from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) through
prosecution. Patents are a PAE’s principal asset; a PAE does not manufac-
ture, distribute, or sell products.
FTC PAE REPORT, supra note 8, at 15.
71. See 2013 GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 19 (“PMEs we spoke with did not develop
technology or sell products but, instead, derived most of their revenue from asserting pat-
ents against operating companies.”).
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practicing entities as “bottom-feeders.”72 By settling claims below the
amount required to defend the lawsuit, the bottom-feeder can take ad-
vantage of certain aspects of patent litigation to extract settlement
amounts from practicing entities below the costs to litigate the matter.73
For example, the FTC has relied on American Intellectual Property Law
Association data to state that it costs about $300,000 to litigate the early
stages of a patent case.74 Thus, the nuisance settlement amount is around
$300,000.75 Further, the FTC has separated Patent Assertion Entities into
two groups: Portfolio Patent Assertion Entities and Litigation Patent As-
sertion Entities.76 Portfolio Patent Assertion Entities maintain large port-
folios of patents and derive a significant amount of revenue from
licensing.77 Moreover, seventy-eight percent of Portfolio Patent Assertion
Entities’ cases settled for a larger amount than $300,000.78 Litigation Pat-
ent Assertion Entities have small portfolios (less than ten patents); they
sue and usually settle shortly thereafter for less than $300,000.79 Litiga-
tion Patent Assertion Entities appear to be closer to entities in Professor
Lemley and Melamed’s bottom-feeder group. Perhaps the most troubling
NPE is one that asserts poor quality patents.80
In short, the taxonomy of potential trolls has become relatively compli-
72. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2176 (2013) [hereinafter Lemley & Melamed]. Notably, “in 2012
PAEs sued more non-tech companies than tech companies.” Colleen Chien, Patent Trolls
by the Numbers, at 2 (Santa Clara Sch. of Law Faculty Publ’ns, 2013), http://digitalcom-
mons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1610&context=facpubs [Perma link unavaila-
ble] [hereinafter Chien, Numbers]. Lemley and Melamed also describe “lottery-ticket”
trolls who “own[ ] a patent and hope[ ] to strike it big in court.” Lemley & Melamed,
supra, at 2126.
73. Professor Lemley and Douglas Melamed argue that the patent troll debate is very
much about systemic problems in the patent system and not so much about one class of
entities and their behavior. Thus, much of the analysis should not be weighted heavily on
practicing status or not. See generally, Lemley & Melamed, supra note 72, at 2121. For a
critique of Professor Lemley and Melamed’s article, see David L. Schwartz, On Mass Pat-
ent Aggregators, 114 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 51, 60–61 (2014). Professors Fiona M. Scott
Morton and Carl Shapiro have stated that PAEs will attempt to use an outsized threat,
such as an injunction or exclusion order, to push a target to settle for a higher royalty rate.
See Scott Morton & Shapiro, Strategic, supra note 69, at 471–75.
74. FTC PAE REPORT, supra note 8, at 43.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 42. Importantly, the FTC found that “Portfolio PAES generally reached li-
censing commitments without bringing litigation against a potential licensee: they executed
71% of their licenses without litigation.” Id. at 46. And, “Portfolio PAEs accounted for 9%
of all licenses in the study [and] these licenses generated 80% of all revenue reported in the
study.” Id.
78. Id. at 91. Notably, the FTC Report found that “53% of Portfolio PAE royalties
were greater than $2.5 million and 25% were between $300,000 and $2.5 million.” Id. at
91–92.
79. Id. at 92.
80. See Chien, Numbers, supra note 72, at 7 (noting sources that show that repeat
NPEs “(8x or more) . . . lose more than 90% of the time in court” and “dominate PAE
cases—61% of defendants named in 2011–2012 were sued by a PAE who had brought the
case 8+ times”).
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cated81 and may be subject to gaming.82 And, indeed, the debate has
moved toward examining specific behavior of certain NPEs to decide
whether they are not acting in socially beneficial ways.83 As Professor
Colleen V. Chien noted in her seminal article, From Arms Race to Mar-
ketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Pat-
ent System,
The competing and even contradictory approaches of the arms race
and marketplace operate alongside each other, not only within in-
dustries, but also oftentimes within companies. A company may use
certain patents defensively to gain freedom to operate, but it may
also opportunistically sell its patents or sue upon them. It may enjoy
patent de´tente with certain of its competitors while also exploiting
the asymmetric stakes it has with companies whose products are cov-
ered by its patents. Some non-practicing entities sue established
companies for infringement of patents they have acquired, and
others develop their own technology and seek to commercialize it.
Each company is unique, and the approach a company takes to its
patents in one area may differ significantly from the approach it
takes in another. These profiles make it harder to make value judg-
ments about companies based solely on whether they do or do not
practice their patents.84
There are a number of factors that may indicate that a particular entity
may be engaging in behavior that should be discouraged. Some factors
that may indicate that a particular entity is behaving similarly to a troll or
81. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and Settle-
ment Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 683 (2011) (describing taxonomy of
entities, which includes several categories of non-practicing entities); see also COUNCIL OF
ECONOMIC ADVISERS ISSUE BRIEF, THE PATENT LITIGATION LANDSCAPE: RECENT RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENTS 3 (2016) [hereinafter COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS]
(“The NPE category includes patent assertion entities (PAEs) that assert infringement of a
patent with the sole goal of generating revenues from licensing or settlements of litigation
and may include individual inventors and universities who solely license patents to
others . . . . These distinctions are not always easy to draw when categorizing plaintiffs in
patent litigation. As a result, some studies do not attempt to differentiate between PAEs
and other NPEs.” (citation omitted)). For a broader discussion of the narratives in patent
litigation, including NPEs, see Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings:
Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1571
(2009) [hereinafter Chien, David].
82. See Feldman, Pace of Change, supra note 62, at 636 (“With much money at stake,
numerous entities have an incentive to craft the definition in a way that omits their own
business model, a process that has resulted in intense lobbying not only of government
officials, but also of academics.”).
83. Professor Carl Shapiro has “cautioned that distinguishing various types of entities
can be a ‘dicey exercise.’” See Erica S. Mintzer & Suzanne Munck, The Joint U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Patent Assertion Entity Activi-
ties—”Follow the Money,” 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 423, 426 (2014). Professor Robert P. Merges
has stated that, “Trolling, to put it simply, is a matter of behavior rather than status. One
can act as a troll, but it will usually not be true that one simply is a troll. The ‘troll line,’ in
other words, must be policed case-by-case and fact-by-fact.” Merges, Trouble with Trolls,
supra note 5, at 1611; see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty
Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2009 (2007) (“Defining a patent troll has proven a tricky
business, but that does not mean [that] the problem does not exist.”).
84. Chien, Arms Race, supra note 68, at 332–33.
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“behaving badly” could include seeking an amount of damages lower
than the cost of litigating the lawsuit;85 filing a case in the Eastern District
of Texas or, more generally, strategic forum shopping;86 seeking willful
infringement damages to incentivize settlement; settling a case very early
in the litigation;87 and a number of defendants88 and lawsuits involving
the patent.89 Some supposed trolls may be asserting patents that based on
some metrics are relatively valuable patents,90 and many are software
patents.91 The metrics used to assess value include “more claims, more
85. The FTC PAE Report identified this as a characteristic of Litigation PAEs. FTC
PAE REPORT, supra note 8, at 10.
86. See 2013 GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 23 (“For 2007 to 2011, an estimated 32
percent of patent infringement lawsuits were filed in 3 of the 94 federal district courts: the
Eastern District of Texas, the District of Delaware, and the Central District of Califor-
nia.”); FTC PAE REPORT, supra note 8, at 80 (“The Eastern District of Texas and the
District of Delaware accounted for the largest share of cases in the study (53% and 22%,
respectively).”); PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, 2014 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 4 (2014),
http://www.patentinsuranceonline.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/2014-patent-litigation-
study.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG6L-3X3D] [hereinafter, PWC 2014 PATENT STUDY] (“NPE
cases continue to be concentrated in certain district courts: five district courts (out of a
total of 94) accounted for 41% of all identified decisions where the patent holder was an
NPE, with the Eastern District of Texas alone accounting for 12% of all identified NPE
decisions.”). The PWC 2014 Patent Study further found that, “Texas Eastern, with the most
identified NPE cases by far, also has one of the highest success rates, almost double the
NPE average.”
87. See David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Enti-
ties in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 449 (2014) [hereinafter Schwartz &
Kesan] (suggesting that future studies consider “the length of time NPE cases last”). Nota-
bly, the 2013 GAO Report found that, “Lawsuits brought by both operating companies
and PMEs settled or likely settled at similar rates. . . . However, our analysis showed a
statistically significant difference between suits involving software-related patents, of which
82 percent settled compared with 89 percent of suits that did not involve software-related
patents.” 2013 GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 25 n.46. Moreover, Professor Michael Risch
notes that,
[S]ettlements might occur because the patents are strong, because the patents
are weak, because defendants feared a jury, because the NPE sought a rea-
sonable settlement that reflected the value of the patent, or because the NPE
sought a nuisance settlement that overvalued the patent but remained less
than trying the case.
See Michael Risch, A Generation of Patent Litigation, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 67, 123
(2015).
88. Professor Colleen Chien found that, “‘Bottom feeder’ trolls make demands of
many companies at once in order to get nuisance settlements. . . . The consensus appeared
to be that many small companies settle such claims made by PAEs, whatever the merit,
because they could not afford to fight them.” Chien, Startups, supra note 47, at 477.
89. Id. at 477–78 (“Small companies are also being used in order to secure a royalty
rate or venue or ‘feed the war chest’ in support of campaigns against larger, deeper-pock-
eted targets, several interviewees said.” (footnote omitted)).
90. Extreme Value, supra note 66, at 28–29.
91. 2013 GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 22 (“Specifically, about 84 percent of PME
lawsuits from 2007 to 2011 involved software-related patents, while about 35 percent of
operating company lawsuits did.”); Bessen and Meurer, Costs, supra note 58, at 394 (“No-
tice failure is likely for NPE lawsuits. Sixty-two percent of the time, they feature software
patents, which are notoriously difficult to interpret . . . [and] patents asserted in NPE law-
suits are often subject to lengthy prosecutions, which delay public access to information
about patent claims.” (footnote omitted)); see also FTC PAE REPORT, supra note 8, at
75–76 (“[A]pproximately 75% of cases solely involved Computers & Communications pat-
ents [and o]nly 7% of Portfolio PAE cases involved patents outside of the Computers &
Communications or Other Electrical & Electronic categories. . . . [F]ewer than 15% of
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prior art citations, more forward citations, a higher likelihood of assign-
ment between issue and litigation, and larger numbers of continuation
applications.”92 Trolls may also assert patents that are late-term patents—
the patented invention has already been developed and the troll is merely
taxing the invention.93 Trolls may also strategically assert patents near
major funding events of companies,94 make outsized claims resulting in
settlements at a nuisance level, assert low quality lawsuits, and “target
firms that are flush with cash.”95 All or a combination of these character-
istics may point toward a particular entity exhibiting troll-like behavior.
B. AN OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND JUDICIAL AND
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES96
The literature concerning patent trolls is substantial and arguably
mixed as to whether troll behavior is problematic.97 However, despite the
mixed nature of whether there is a problem and vigorous arguments con-
cerning the merits of patent trolls, the courts, legislators, and others have
attempted to solve the patent troll problem. This section first examines
the literature concerning whether a patent troll problem exists and sec-
ondly examines and attempts to address the supposed patent troll
problem.
Litigation PAE cases involved patents outside of the Other Electrical & Electronic cate-
gory and the Computers & Communication category.”).
92. Extreme Value, supra note 66, at 28.
93. Love, Timing, supra note 54, at 1312. PriceWaterhouseCopper finds that,
[T]he overall success rate for practicing entities is 10% higher than that for
NPEs over the last 19 years. NPEs are much less successful at the summary
judgement stage: winning in only 3% of identified decisions, as opposed to
10% for practicing entities. Conversely, the trial success rate for practicing
entities is nearly identical to that for NPEs, at roughly two-thirds.
PWC 2014 PATENT STUDY, supra note 86, at 10.
94. See Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Patent Demands and Initial Public Offer-
ings, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 52, 54 (2015) (“[R]oughly 60% of information technology
respondents reported receiving patent demands in the periods around the company’s
IPO.”).
95. Lauren Cohen, Umit G. Gurun & Scott Duke Kominers, Patent Trolls: Evidence
from Targeted Firms 3 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 15-002, 2014 (Revised Apr.
2017)), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=47648 [https://perma.cc/FNX8-
CNJR] [hereinafter Cohen, Gurun & Kominers]. For a shorter version of the article, please
see Lauren Cohen, Umit G. Gurun & Scott Duke Kominers, The Growing Problem of
Patent Trolling: Cash-Hungry Patent Trolls are Squelching Innovation—and Should Be
Screened Out, 352 SCIENCE 521, 521 (2016).
96. For an excellent overview of the literature concerning patent trolls, please see
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, supra note 81, at 1; FTC PAE REPORT, supra note 8, at
20–28. PriceWaterhouseCooper also has published numerous yearly studies on patent
litigation, which collect statistics concerning patent litigation suits for each year. For
example, PriceWaterhouseCooper found that, as of 2014, “[d]amages awards for NPEs
averaged more than triple those for practicing entities over the last four years.” PWC 2014
PATENT STUDY, supra note 86, at 3.
97. This paper highlights certain patent troll literature, but it does not attempt to ad-
dress all patent troll literature.
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1. A Sample of the Literature
As discussed supra, the primary argument against trolls is that they do
not contribute to innovation but merely tax or thwart it. The argument in
favor of trolls is that they may contribute to innovation by ultimately ben-
efiting inventors through the creation of markets for inventions. Notably,
the evidence concerning whether the costs outweigh the benefits of trolls
is unclear.98 For example, the FTC released a report entitled Patent As-
sertion Activity: An FTC Study, which analyzed non-public evidence col-
lected from Patent Assertion Entities concerning “acquisition, litigation,
and licensing practices.”99 The FTC report makes numerous helpful find-
ings; however, the FTC “does not address the efficiency of PAE business
models” because the data collection procedures of the surveyed PAEs
were not uniform.100 Essentially, the FTC had difficulty ascertaining the
amount of licensing revenue that may be returned to independent inven-
tors.101 At the same time, Professors Bessen and Meurer found that the
direct cost on practicing entities from NPE litigation was around “$29
billion in 2011” and “much of this burden falls on small and medium-
sized companies.”102 Bessen and Meurer further state that “publicly
traded NPEs likely cost small and medium-sized firms more money than
these NPEs transfer to inventors.”103 However, Professors Kesan and
Schwartz strongly criticize the methodology of Bessen and Meurer’s
98. See Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 87, at 451 (“Currently, there is a lack of scien-
tific evidence that widespread and systemic problems exist with NPEs.”). Moreover, the
Council of Economic Advisors notes that there is a greater need for more research con-
cerning the effect of trolls on entrepreneurship, as opposed to innovation. See COUNCIL OF
ECONOMIC ADVISERS, supra note 81, at 5 (discussing a paper “investigat[ing] the link be-
tween levels of patent litigation and venture capital (VC) investment in the United States,
[as] an indicator of levels of entrepreneurial activity. [The paper] conclude[s] that VC in-
vestment initially increases with the number of litigated patents, but that beyond a certain
threshold, further increases in litigated patents are associated with decreased VC invest-
ment.”); see also Lu, supra note 64, at 61 (“Empirically identifying and quantifying the
benefits of NPEs are deemed to be challenging.”). Notably, one of the overarching
problems in this area of scholarship is that the data underlying studies is often confidential.
In a seminal article examining PAE suits between 2010 and 2012, Professor Christopher A.
Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan, and David L. Schwartz release the data underlying their paper. See
Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, Unpacking Patent Assertion
Entities (PAES), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649, 654–55 (2014). One of the important findings is
that an increase in patent filings after 2011 was likely due to the joinder rule changes in the
America Invents Act. Cotropia, Kesan & Schwartz, supra, at 655.
99. FTC PAE REPORT, supra note 8, at 2.
100. Id. at 8.
101. Id.
102. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 COR-
NELL L. REV. 387, 389 (2014).
103. See id. (emphasis added). Professors Fiona M. Scott Morton and Carl Shapiro,
relying on Bessen and Meurer’s empirical evidence, find that “additional patent monetiza-
tion by PAEs is problematic from a public policy perspective.” See Scott Morton & Sha-
piro, supra note 69, at 494. Professors Morton and Shapiro state “[p]atent monetization
harms consumers and decreases social welfare if the asserted patents do not create sub-
stantial value for the target products or consumers and if the original innovator does not
receive a significant fraction of costs imposed by the PAE on its targets.” Scott Morton &
Shapiro, supra note 69, at 494.
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work.104 In a separate study, Professor Roger Smeets finds that small
firms experience a decrease in investment in innovation after patent
litigation.105
Moreover, numerous scholars have attempted to validate whether the
arguments for and against trolls are supported empirically. In a published
draft paper titled Patent Trolls: Evidence from Targeted Firms, Lauren
Cohen, Umit G. Gurun, and Scott Duke Kominers state “that the key
question for assessing NPEs’ welfare impact concerns lawsuit targeting
behavior: Do NPEs on average police against true infringement, or do they
primarily behave opportunistically, bringing lawsuits irrespective of
whether infringement has occurred?”106 The answer to this question, ac-
cording to their research, is “that NPEs appear to behave opportunisti-
cally.”107 They make numerous findings that support this conclusion:
First, they find that firms with substantial cash resources are often the
targets of NPEs, including when compared to practicing entities.108 Sec-
ond, they find that “NPEs bring lower-quality lawsuits, and [there is] evi-
dence that NPEs are actively forum shopping.”109 Third, they find that
“NPEs target firms against which they have a higher ex ante likelihood of
winning . . . [such as] target[ing] firms that are busy dealing with other,
non-IP related litigation.”110 Fourth, similar to other authors, they find
that “NPEs frequently . . . assert patents that appear to be broader, word-
ier, and closer to expiry than those asserted by PEs.” Finally, the authors
state,
Using a differences-in-differences approach, we find that firms that
lose to NPEs (either in court or through settlement) reduce their
research and development investment by roughly 20% going for-
ward, relative to ex ante identical firms. Thus, our evidence suggests
104. See Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 87, at 431–48. Schwartz and Kesan argue that
there are at least four problems with the methodology, including “[f]igures [b]ased on [a
b]iased [s]ample”; “[l]ack of [b]asis for [c]omparison of [f]igures”; [q]uestionable
[d]efinition of NPE”; and “[l]ack of [c]redible [i]nformation on [b]enefits of NPEs.” See id.
at 433. Professors Kesan and Schwartz conclude that,
[W]e believe that Bessen and Meurer have not provided sufficient valid data
to make a full diagnosis of the problem. They have not adequately studied
the problem, and therefore we believe that their conclusions are premature
and perhaps even unfounded. Currently, there is a lack of scientific evidence
that widespread and systematic problems exist with NPEs, and if they do,
what the magnitude of the problem is.
Id. at 451.
105. See Roger Smeets, Does Patent Litigation Reduce Corporate R&D? An Analysis of
US Public Firms 3 (Apr. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/272299903_Does_Patent_Litigation_Reduce_Corporate_RD_An_Analysis_
of_US_Public_Firms?e=prf_high [Perma link unavailable] (“The reduction in R&D inten-
sity is between 2.6–4.7% . . . . [T]he R&D-deterring impact of patent litigation is most
pronounced when there is technological overlap between the patent(s) asserted in the law-
suit, and the patent portfolio of the defendant.”).
106. Cohen, Gurun & Kominers, supra note 95, at 2.
107. Id. at 3.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 4.
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that NPE litigation causes a real decrease in innovation at targeted
firms. Of course, when NPEs win lawsuits, some of the losses to the
targeted firms—part of the settlement or damage award, but not the
legal costs—should eventually flow back to end inventors. The best
available estimates suggest, however, that only a small fraction of the
damages won by NPEs are actually paid back to innovators. As our
theoretical model illustrates, when only small transfers reach end in-
ventors, NPEs’ value in encouraging invention—both directly and in-
directly—is significantly dampened. Moreover, we show empirical
evidence consistent with this lack of pass-through impact from NPEs
on innovation.111
On the other hand, Professor Michael Risch finds in an examination of
the practices of the ten most litigious NPEs that many beliefs about pat-
ent trolls are not supported.112 For example, he finds that (1) “NPEs are
not particularly new”; (2) “their patents look like other litigated patents”;
(3) the available information implies that NPE patent quality is not dras-
tically lower than other litigated patents’. The same cannot be said for
litigation quality; trolls almost never won infringement judgments.”; (4)
“productive companies originally obtained most of the patents now as-
serted by NPEs, and non-productive companies whose only purpose was
to obtain and monetize patents originally obtained a few of the patents”;
(5) “very few of the companies supplying patents to NPEs are out of busi-
ness; instead, most patents came from productive companies and most of
those continue to operate”; and (6) “[W]hile the timing of lawsuits was
not consistently ‘trollish,’ the moniker may be somewhat accurate. The
average patent sat on the shelf for more than seven years before being
litigated, though several were asserted almost immediately.”113 Professor
Risch also finds that some arguments in support of so-called trolls are not
supported by evidence.114 For example, he finds that,
First, the evidence does not support a theory that NPEs incentivize
investment by providing a market for patents. A small percentage of
111. Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). Importantly, Professor Ted Sichelman
has critiqued an August 2014 version of this paper. He states:
In sum, the study does not make well-justified findings and as such should
not be relied upon in any fashion for policymaking. First, at least in the cur-
rent version of the paper, the authors rely on a dataset that is incomplete and
very likely unrepresentative. Second, the authors make numerous explicit or
implicit assumptions regarding patents and patent litigation that are inaccu-
rate or incomplete—including the nature of patent scope, the drivers of pat-
ent infringement, litigation remedies, litigant (especially NPE) types, the role
of law firms, and the categorization of case outcomes—that additionally cast
doubt on the soundness of their findings. Finally, even if every one of the
authors’ findings were correct, they draw inferences and make policy pre-
scriptions not supported by their findings.
Ted Sichelman, Are Patent Trolls “Opportunistic”? 3 (San Diego Legal Studies Paper, No.
14-175, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2520125 [https://
perma.cc/DZ3M-L47A].
112. See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 460 (2012)
[hereinafter Risch, Myths].
113. Id. at 460–61.
114. Id. at 461.
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the companies that obtained NPE patents received venture capital
investment, as did a random group of companies that held patents.
While there is a difference between the two, that difference is not
clearly attributable to NPE activity. That said, any startup holding a
patent is much more likely to receive funding than a company with-
out patents, and it is at least possible that NPEs contribute to this
increased probability.
Second, it is unlikely that NPEs are vindicating the rights of small
companies forced out of business by infringers. Very few of the initial
owners of NPE patents failed, and the patents were held for a long
time before they were asserted. Finally, the evidence does support
one defense of NPEs: NPEs provide a better way for individual in-
ventors to enforce their patents than bringing lawsuits themselves.115
Professor Risch’s overall point is that supposed troll litigation does not
look substantially different than litigation involving practicing entities.116
In an important article on measuring patent licensing demands’ impact
on innovation, Professors Robin Feldman and Mark Lemley find that pat-
ent demands do not, in most cases, lead to innovation.117 In fact, the au-
thors find that “very few patent license demands actually lead to new
innovation; most demands simply involve payment for the freedom to
keep doing what the licensee was already doing.”118 As discussed supra,
one of the arguments in favor of patent trolls is that they serve to facili-
tate matchmaking between patent holders and commercialization part-
ners. Professors Feldman and Lemley seem to refute that argument;
however, as the authors note, there are a small number of respondents to
the survey.119 Thus, the authors call for more research.120 Importantly,
the authors state, “[O]ur results seem to hold regardless of whether the
patent owner seeking a license is a patent troll, a product-producing com-
pany, or a university.”121 In fact, even demands from universities “were
also unlikely to generate technology transfer.”122 This seems to indicate
that those demands merely tax innovation without contributing to it. The
FTC found that patent demands tend not to lead to licensing revenue
without also filing litigation.123 This leads the FTC to recommend that
reforming practices concerning demand letters may not lead to meaning-
ful change.124
Commentators have made numerous proposals to address the sup-
115. Id.
116. Id. at 458.
117. Feldman & Lemley, Demands, supra note 50, at 137.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 139.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 160.
123. FTC PAE REPORT, supra note 8, at 13.
124. Id. at 5.
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posed patent troll problem.125 For example, Professor Brian J. Love has
recommended ending patent terms earlier and increasing maintenance
fees to address NPEs that likely assert patents ex post.126 Professors Lem-
ley and Melamed have suggested reforms, including reducing the costs of
discovery to make bottom-feeder activity less profitable.127
2. Some Judicial and Legislative Responses
Despite the relatively mixed evidence concerning the merits of patent
trolls, the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit have issued numerous decisions that arguably are directed
at addressing the patent troll phenomena. Each of these decisions at-
tempts to make it more difficult for the patent troll business model to
succeed. The U.S. Congress and state legislators have also passed legisla-
tion to address the patent troll phenomena.
The first U.S. Supreme Court decision to address patent trolls is likely
the eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. decision.128 In that case, the U.S.
Supreme Court directed lower courts to apply the four-factor test for is-
suing permanent injunctions instead of a modified test that had been ap-
plied by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.129 The Federal
Circuit’s test made it easier to obtain a permanent injunction. In a con-
currence in that case, Justice Kennedy specifically addressed the patent
troll issue, stating,
In cases now arising trial courts should bear in mind that in many
instances the nature of the patent being enforced and the economic
function of the patent holder present considerations quite unlike ear-
lier cases. An industry has developed in which firms use patents not
as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for
obtaining licensing fees. For these firms, an injunction, and the po-
tentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed
as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek
to buy licenses to practice the patent.130
This case arguably reduced the leverage possessed by patent trolls by les-
sening the likelihood of the issuance of a permanent injunction. This re-
sults in a lessening of the opportunity of a patent troll to assert an
outsized claim.
The U.S. Supreme Court also issued KSR International Co. v. Teleflex
125. Patent reform proposals directed to the overall patent system may alleviate some
of the issues associated with supposed patent trolls. For example, Professor Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette proposed to use peer review to strengthen patent disclosure. See Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 590–95
(2012); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Pierson, Peer Review, and Patent Law, 69 VAND. L. REV.
1825, 1836–48 (2016).
126. Love, Timing, supra note 54, at 1313–14.
127. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 72, at 2177.
128. 547 U.S. 388, 390–91 (2006).
129. Id. at 393–94.
130. Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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Inc., which made it easier to find some patented inventions obvious.131 In
that case, the Supreme Court rejected a rigid application of the teaching,
suggestion, and motivation test to determine obviousness.132 The Su-
preme Court allowed a flexible application of the test, which makes it
more likely that patented combination inventions may be found
obvious.133
The U.S. Supreme Court issued the Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health
& Fitness, Inc. decision134 and a companion case, Highmark Inc. v. All-
care Health Management System, Inc.135 The Octane Fitness decision
makes it easier to obtain attorney’s fees against parties bringing excep-
tional cases.136 Thus, a party defending litigation brought by a troll may
be more likely to obtain attorney’s fees, which may provide a disincentive
for trolls to litigate a frivolous suit.137 This increases the leverage availa-
ble to alleged infringers against patent trolls.
In a series of cases restricting the scope of patent eligible subject mat-
ter, the U.S. Supreme Court also made it more likely that patents con-
trolled by patent trolls are invalid, particularly in the software space.138
Specifically, in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, the U.S.
Supreme Court applied a test that makes claims on pure software likely
invalid.139 The Federal Circuit has defined this test in a way to make
some software patents valid,140 but several prominent intellectual prop-
erty groups are attempting to legislatively overrule Alice and recent re-
lated cases.141
In TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC,142 the U.S.
131. 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007).
132. See generally id.
133. Id.
134. 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).
135. 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).
136. Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1755–56.
137. Recently, the Federal Circuit decided in Lumen View Technology LLC v.
Findthebest.com, Inc. that an exceptional case finding was appropriate, but it was improper
to double the awarded fees for the purpose of added deterrence against a supposed troll.
811 F.3d 479, 484 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Federal Circuit does state that the judge can con-
sider deterrence when determining whether to order the fees, but not in assessing the
amount of fees. Id. at 484–85. The court also indicated that Rule 11 sanctions may be
available. Id. at 485. This case may not create a sufficient specific and general deterrence
effect on trolls.
138. Professor Lisa Larrimore Ouellette states that courts should be comfortable with
drawing bright-line PESM tests because there are other incentives to promote invention in
certain technological fields such as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. See Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Nonpatent Innovation Incentives, 5 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 1115, 1119–20 (2015).
139. 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2350–51 (2014).
140. See, e.g., Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1299–30 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
141. See, e.g., Letter from Mark Whitaker, President, Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n,
to President-Elect Donald J. Trump (Jan. 4, 2017) (on file with the American Intellectual
Property Law Association), http://www.aipla.org/resources2/reports/2017AIPLADirect/
Documents/AIPLA%20Letter%20to%20President-Elect%20Donald%20Trump.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NXH8-G8Q7].
142. 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 (2017).
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Supreme Court interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), the patent venue statute,
to make it more likely that cases will not be brought in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas. The Eastern District of Texas is often viewed as a proplain-
tiff and pro-troll venue.143
In the 2011 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. decision, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided that the twenty-five per-
cent rule for determining damages was inappropriate and that damages
awards should take into account the relative contribution of the patent to
the alleged infringing product.144 This decision and others apparently led
to lower damages awards.145
Congress passed The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), which
contains numerous provisions that may impact patent trolls.146 First, the
Inter Partes Review Proceedings allow parties to quickly and inexpen-
sively challenge patents on specific grounds.147 This allows parties de-
fending troll suits to invalidate patents held by trolls. Second, there is a
specific transitional program allowing for challenging business method
patents.148 Third, the AIA created a post-grant review process to chal-
lenge patents based on more grounds than IPRs.149 The AIA also re-
stricts the number of defendants that can be joined in a single lawsuit,
which was directed at patent trolls who frequently joined many defend-
ants.150 This enactment likely increased the costs of filing for supposed
patent trolls. The GAO found that there was a relatively sharp increase in
filings immediately prior to the enactment of the AIA.
Congress has also considered numerous legislative proposals to address
patent trolls.151 The FTC Report describes two bills that make the follow-
ing changes: “[g]reater specificity in demand letters”; “[h]eightened
pleading requirements”; “[g]reater transparency of patent ownership”;
143. See Daniel Nazer & Vera Ranieri, Why Do Patent Trolls Go to Texas? It’s Not for
the BBQ, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (July 9, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2014/07/why-do-patent-trolls-go-texas-its-not-bbq [https://perma.cc/Z5M6-2GFQ]; Adam
Liptak, Supreme Court Considers Why Patent Trolls Love Texas, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/business/supreme-court-patent-trolls-tc-heart
land-kraft.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fadam-liptak&action=click&contentCollec-
tion=undefined&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlace
ment=147&pgtype=collection [Perma link unavailable] (“More than 40 percent of patent
lawsuits are filed in a federal court in East Texas with a reputation for friendliness to
plaintiffs.”).
144. 632 F.3d 1292, 1315–18 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
145. 2013 GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 33–34 (“[S]takeholders noted this 2011 deci-
sion and other decisions have had the effect of lowering damage awards to reflect a pat-
ent’s value or eliminated the potential for enhanced damages.”).
146. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of Title 35 of the United States Code).
147. See 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 311–319 (West 2013); 2013 GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 8.
148. 37 C.F.R. § 42.300 (2016); 2013 GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 9.
149. 2013 GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 9.
150. 35 U.S.C.A § 299 (West 2013); 2013 GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 15.
151. See Patent Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent Reform Legislation, PAT. PROGRESS,
https://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-guide-
patent-reform-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/PJ4M-N3D6] (last visited Feb. 7, 2018)
(describing fourteen bills directed at patent reform and trolls).
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“[e]nd-user stay of infringement litigation”; “[l]imiting discovery costs”;
and “[f]ee-shifting to losing parties.”152
In 2015, the United States Supreme Court abrogated the use of Form
18 for complaints, which allowed for very simple pleadings without detail
in patent infringement cases.153 Notably, patent infringement plaintiffs
must now comply with the much higher pleading standards in Bell Atlan-
tic Corp. v. Twombly154 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.155
Additionally, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) adopted
numerous initiatives to improve patent quality.156 However, this may not
address the patent troll issue as many patents asserted by trolls appear to
be valuable patents. While value may not map exactly onto quality, there
may be a relationship between the two given the factors used to deter-
mine value. For example, more claims may mean that at least one claim
will be narrow enough to overcome an obviousness challenge; although, a
narrow claim may make infringement less likely. Finally, state legislators
have passed legislation designed to confront the patent troll problem.157
C. THE SNE DATASET158
The SNE Dataset is an ambitious project conducted at Stanford Uni-
versity Law School reviewing nonpracticing entity litigation activity.159
As discussed supra, one of the most difficult issues concerning analyzing
the impact of nonpracticing entity litigation is attempting to categorize
those entities by behavior. The researchers at Stanford used the classifica-
tion system developed by Professors Allison, Lemley, and Walker to cate-
gorize thousands of patent litigations filed in U.S. district court from 2000
152. FTC PAE REPORT, supra note 8, at 32–33. The FTC also entered into a settlement
agreement with a supposed troll. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Settlement
Bars Patent Assertion Entity from Using Deceptive Tactics (Nov. 6, 2014), https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/11/ftc-settlement-bars-patent-assertion-en-
tity-using-deceptive [https://perma.cc/R8HS-WUGV]; see also Mike Mireles, U.S. Federal
Trade Commission and NPE Enter Settlement Agreement, IP FIN. (Nov. 6, 2014, 9:21 PM),
http://www.ip.finance/2014/11/us-federal-trade-commission-and-npe.html [https://perma.cc/
6YQA-DSB3].
153. Supreme Court of the United States, Order of April 29, 2015, https://
www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv15(update)_1823.pdf [https://perma.cc/
LX7T-G54B] (ordering the 2015 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
154. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
155. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). For additional discussion about the impact of Form 18’s abro-
gation, see Leeron Morad & Andrew J. Bramhall, An Early Review of the Impact of Form
18’s Elimination on Pleading Direct Infringement, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 6, 2016), https://
patentlyo.com/patent/2016/04/elimination-pleading-infringement.html#_edn3 [https://
perma.cc/VPP3-6HZG].
156. For a description of some of these proposals, see 2013 GAO REPORT, supra note 8,
at 39–44.
157. See Rebecca Schoff Curtin, Slapping Patent Trolls: What Anti-Trolling Legislation
Can Learn from the Anti-SLAPP Movement, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 39, 52–66 (2014)
(discussing state anti-troll legislation).
158. Shawn P. Miller et al., Introduction to the Stanford NPE Litigation Dataset 1 (Oct.
23, 2017 draft), https://law.stanford.edu/projects/stanford-npe-litigation-dataset/#slsnav-
suggested-research-uses [https://perma.cc/D3JK-H7FA].
159. Id.
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to 2015.160 The currently released dataset “include[es] a 20% random
sample of lawsuits filed between 2000 and 2015”; the dataset covers even
years from 2000 through 2014 and essentially every lawsuit filed in 2011,
2012, and 2013.161
The classification system includes the following categories: (1) acquired
patents; (2) university heritage or tie; (3) failed startup; (4) corporate her-
itage; (5) individual-inventor-started company; (6) university/govern-
ment/non-profit; (7) startup, pre-product; (8) product company; (9)
individual; (10) undetermined; (11) industry consortium; (12) IP subsidi-
ary of product company; and (13) corporate-inventor-started company.162
In categorizing the litigations, the researchers used LexMachina’s
database concerning patent litigation as well as categorization informa-
tion from other researchers. The researchers note that only one type of
patent asserter, Category 8 (product company), is a “practicing entit[y
that] actually make[s] products or offer[s] services for sale.” Moreover,
“entities . . . [in] Category 1 (acquired patents), Category 4 (corporate
heritage), or Category 5 (individual-inventor started company)” are typi-
cally known as “patent troll[s]” by “those who use the term.”163
The two most important categories that are the subject of this article
include category 2, university heritage or tie, and category 6, university/
government/non-profit. According to the researchers, “Category 6 in-
cludes any patent asserter that is a university, government entity, or a
not-for-profit institution.” Additionally, the researchers state, “Category
2 entities are not themselves universities but are rather ‘IP subsidiaries’ of
universities or separate licensing firms known to primarily assert patent
rights on behalf of universities. Examples include the Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation, the University of Colorado Foundation, and Com-
petitive Technologies Inc.” The evidence used to categorize entities as
Category 2 included “[t]he pleadings, company website, news reports, or
other filings indicat[ing] that the company has ties to a university or exists
to license university intellectual property [and t]here is no evidence sug-
gesting the entity is actually the university itself or an alias for the univer-
sity.”164 The evidence used for Category 6 included evidence that “[t]he
pleadings or website of the entity states that it is an institution for higher
education, a government body, or a non-profit organization.”165
III. UNIVERSITY AND NON-PROFIT PATENTING AND
LITIGATION
This Part discusses university and non-profit patent litigation. First, it
160. Id. at 6.
161. Id. at 8.
162. Id. at 6.
163. Id. at 7.
164. Id. at 10–11.
165. Id. at 12.
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reviews U.S. universities, including the Bayh-Dole Act,166 prior research
concerning university litigation, and additional patent related legislation
and case law that privileges many universities in the patent sphere in the
United States. This Part also discusses non-profit and foreign university
patent litigation. As discussed infra, separating out the litigation by these
types of entities provides a more nuanced analysis about the litigation
itself and the possible implications of that litigation. Finally, there is a
discussion of the reasons for concern for the future of university and non-
profit litigation.
A. U.S. UNIVERSITIES
U.S. universities are public and private;167 although, almost all private
universities benefit from some public subsidy.168 U.S. public and private
universities also benefit from a charitable tax deduction for donations to
universities that may form an endowment, which helps fund the activities
of the university.169 Many public and private universities have substantial
endowments.170 For example, Stanford University’s endowment was
$22,398,130,000; the University of California system’s was $8,341,073,000;
University of Wisconsin Foundation’s was $2,419,161,000; and the Michi-
gan State University Foundation’s was $361,090,000.171
Importantly, many U.S. universities originated as land-grant col-
leges.172 These are colleges that were created for a specific purpose: “to
provide instruction in agriculture and the mechanical arts, conduct agri-
cultural research, and deliver knowledge and practical information to
166. University and Small Business Patent Procedures (Bayh-Dole) Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211 (2000)).
167. For a listing of public and land-grant universities, see the members list of the Asso-
ciation of Public & Land-Grant Universities, Members, ASS’N PUB. & LAND-GRANT U.
http://www.aplu.org/members/ [https://perma.cc/N5T7-3RPX].
168. See M. Douglas, Public and Private: What’s the Difference?, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(Mar. 6, 2006), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2006/03/06/lombardi [https://
perma.cc/DS2Z-F8UC] (discussing public benefits provided to private universities).
169.  See AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC., UNDERSTANDING COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY EN-
DOWMENTS (2014), http://www.acenet.edu/news-room/Documents/Understanding-Endow-
ments-White-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/MPL5-FV2H]; ASS’N OF AM. UNIVS.,
CHARITABLE GIVING AND UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SEC-
TION 170 (2014), https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAU%20Files/Key%20Issues/Tax-
ation%20%26%20Finance/Charitable-Gifts-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5PU-FZX7]
(“As charitable tax-exempt entities, universities and the foundations that support them are
among the beneficiaries of individual and corporate giving. . . . [U]niversities and colleges
in 2013 received $33.8 billion in charitable gifts to support their educational missions of
teaching, research, and public service.”).
170. See NAT’L ASS’N OF COL. AND UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS, U.S. AND CANADIAN INSTI-
TUTIONS LISTED BY FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2016 ENDOWMENT MARKET VALUE AND CHANGE
IN ENDOWMENT MARKET VALUE FROM FY2015 TO FY2016 (revised Feb. 2017), http://
www.nacubo.org/Documents/EndowmentFiles/2016-Endowment-Market-Values.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/AJV2-5HT6] [hereinafter ENDOWMENT VALUE].
171. Id. Individual University of California campuses have endowments listed sepa-
rately as well. See id.
172. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COLLEGES OF AGRICULTURE AT THE
LAND GRANT UNIVERSITIES: A PROFILE 1–2 (1995), https://www.nap.edu/read/4980/chap-
ter/2 [https://perma.cc/SA4U-Z6GB].
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farmers and consumers.”173 Thus, these universities had a clear mission
that was arguably grounded in practical and applied knowledge. Moreo-
ver, land-grant universities were funded through an endowment provided
to states, created through the sale or use of federal lands for profit.174
These universities could be private or public.
U.S. universities have been engaged in technology transfer for decades.
Indeed, some have argued that the culture in many U.S. universities is
suited to encouraging the close collaboration between industry and
academia. The primary method of technology transfer is the passage of
information from professor to student. Other forms of technology trans-
fer include publications, consulting, patents, and collaborative
engagements.
The first part of this section discusses the Bayh-Dole Act, which argua-
bly changed university technology transfer throughout the world by creat-
ing incentives for universities, non-profits, and others to commercialize
technology through the allocation of ownership of patented government-
funded inventions.175 Many scholars have criticized the Bayh-Dole Act
for arguably creating unintended consequences, including shifting norms
in academia as well as the development of an anticommons thwarting
innovation.176 However, the Bayh-Dole Act has many supporters, and a
version of the Bayh-Dole Act has been adopted in many countries.177 The
second section discusses in detail several prior studies conducted examin-
ing university litigation. Finally, there is a discussion of universities as a
privileged class of entities in U.S. patent law.
1. The Bayh-Dole Act
The Economist has called the Bayh-Dole Act “[p]ossibly the most in-
spired piece of legislation to be enacted in America over the past half-
century.”178 The impact of the Bayh-Dole Act should not be understated.
For example, the Association of University Technology Transfer Manag-
ers (AUTM) tracks the number of patents and licensing deals by universi-
ties per year in its annual survey.179 Notably, patenting and licensing has
173. Id. at 1.
174. Id. at 2–3.
175. See THEODORE M. HAGELIN, TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION LAW AND PRACTICE:
CASES AND MATERIALS 38–39 (2011) [hereinafter HAGELIN].
176. See generally Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the
Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 294 (2003); Gary Pulsinelli,
Share and Share Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded Inventions Under the
Bayh-Dole Act, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 393, 415–18, 425 (2006).
177. See Michael S. Mireles, Adoption of the Bayh-Dole Act in Developed Countries:
Added Pressure for a Broad Research Exemption in the United States?, 59 ME. L. REV. 259,
260 (2007); Michael S. Mireles, The Bayh-Dole Act and Incentives for the Commercializa-
tion of Government-Funded Invention in Developing Countries, 76 UMKC L. REV. 525, 525
(2007).
178. Opinion, Innovation’s Golden Goose, ECONOMIST (Dec. 12, 2002), http://
www.economist.com/node/1476653 [https://perma.cc/3GGZ-9SGQ].
179. AUTM Licensing Activity Surveys, ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, https://
www.autm.net/resources-surveys/research-reports-databases/licensingsurveys/ [https://
perma.cc/7J7W-3YNN].
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increased substantially since the passage of the Act. The National Acad-
emy of Sciences compared AUTM annual surveys from 1996 to 2004 and
found that “[n]ew patent applications filed increased from an average of
22.8 per institution [surveyed] . . . to an average of 73.4 per institution in
2004.”180 This represented a growth of 222% per institution.181 In 2014,
6,363 U.S. patents were issued, representing an 11% increase over the
prior year.182 In 2015, AUTM found that 6,680 U.S. patents were issued
to universities, which represented a 5% increase over the prior year.183
Despite this increase in patenting by universities post-Bayh-Dole Act,
Professor Ted Sichelman points to the undercommercialization of these
patented technologies and the difficulties of tailoring patents to en-
courage commercialization.184
The Bayh-Dole Act creates incentives for universities to patent and
license government-funded inventions.185 Prior to passage of the Act,
each distributor of federal funding for inventions had its own policy con-
cerning the ownership and licensing of government-funded inventions.186
Arguably, this failure to have a harmonized policy and the allocation of
ownership under the prior policies resulted in a tragedy—the undercom-
mercialization of government-funded inventions.187 This essentially
meant that prior to the Bayh-Dole Act many government-funded inven-
tions “languished” on the shelf and were unable to attract the necessary
capital and effort to commercialize those inventions for the benefit of the
public.188 The Bayh-Dole Act harmonizes the policies to create a main
overarching system for the treatment of government-funded inven-
tions.189 Importantly, the Bayh-Dole Act creates incentives for universi-
180. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 19 (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2011).
181. Id.
182. ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, U.S. LICENSING ACTIVITY SURVEY: FY2014
(2016), http://www.autm.net/resources-surveys/research-reports-databases/licensing-
surveys/fy-2014-licensing-survey/ [https://perma.cc/6AH7-LM8Q].
183. ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, U.S. LICENSING ACTIVITY SURVEY: FY2015
(2017), http://www.autm.net/fy2015-survey [https://perma.cc/QLC8-DMRL].
184. See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 362–88 (2010).
Professor Sichelman argues for a “commercialization patent.” Id. at 396. One major re-
search institution in the United States has decided to decline to claim intellectual property
rights in its research. See Christian A. Angotti, The Industry Too Big to Fall . . . Stumbling:
Evaluating Academia’s Use of Patent Rights and Its Consequential Effects on Public-Private
Partnership Negotiations with Pharmaceutical Companies, 18 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 219, 220
(2016) (“Penn State’s Office of Technology Management realized ‘[the traditional method]
has kept some industry from collaborating with academia.’”).
185. See Robert Hardy, 21 Questions and Answers about University Technology Trans-
fer 8 (Council on Governmental Relations, 2010), http://www.cogr.edu/sites/default/files/
21_Questions_Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/6L25-4NQE].
186. See id. at 6.
187. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1669–70
(1996).
188. See id. at 1702; HAGELIN, supra note 175, at 486 (“It was estimated that only 5% of
government-owned patents were ever licensed to the private sector.”).
189. See Eisenberg, supra note 187, at 1669–70; HAGELIN, supra note 175, at 486
(“There were many barriers to licensing government-owned patents, including the length
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ties, researchers, and private industry to engage in the commercialization
of government-funded inventions.190 The stated purposes of the Bayh-
Dole Act are as follows:
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system
to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally sup-
ported research or development; to encourage maximum participa-
tion of small business firms in federally supported research and
development efforts; to promote collaboration between commercial
concerns and nonprofit organizations, including universities; to en-
sure that inventions made by nonprofit organizations and small busi-
ness firms are used in a manner to promote free competition and
enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and discov-
ery; to promote the commercialization and public availability of in-
ventions made in the United States by United States industry and
labor; to ensure that the Government obtains sufficient rights in fed-
erally supported inventions to meet the needs of the Government
and protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of inven-
tions; and to minimize the costs of administering policies in this
area.191
While not stated in the statute, Professors Ouellette and Hemel have
recognized another rationale for the Bayh-Dole Act besides the commer-
cialization justification.192 Basically, they assert that legislation similar to
the Bayh-Dole Act allows countries to internalize the costs of govern-
ment-funded invention and allows them to recoup those costs—at least
when engaging in foreign patenting.193 Interestingly, this theory could re-
sult in additional patenting and licensing activity, as each country with a
Bayh-Dole Act would need to ensure that patenting was global in nature,
or at least that major markets were covered. The current costs of patent-
ing may make it unlikely that many entities can cover global patenting;
however, certain important inventions may merit those costs.
The main thrust of the Bayh-Dole Act is to allow universities, non-
profits, and other entities to take title to government-funded invention. It
of negotiations with agency bureaucracies, the availability of only non-exclusive licenses
and the myriad agency policies regarding licensing; the House Report accompanying the
Bayh-Dole Act noted that the 26 federal funding agencies each had its own unique licens-
ing policy.”).
190. See HAGELIN, supra note 175, at 486 (“The rationale underlying the Bayh-Dole
Act was that, by allowing universities to elect to take title to patents resulting from feder-
ally funded research, universities would have a direct incentive to license these patents to
the private sector for royalty income.”). See generally, Mireles, States as Innovation System
Laboratories, supra note 3, at 1136. Congress also passed the Stevenson-Wydler Technol-
ogy Innovation Act in 1980, which directed federal laboratories to make technology trans-
fer a priority. See Eisenberg, supra note 187, at 1665. “The Bayh-Dole Act generally
applies to all ‘funding agreements,’ which are defined as government contracts, grants, and
cooperative agreements . . . ‘for the performance of experimental, developmental, or re-
search work.’” INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 12 (Aline C. Flower
ed., 2006) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000)) [hereinafter Flower].
191. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000).
192. See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Bayh-Dole Beyond Borders, J.L.
& BIOSCIENCES 282, 282 (2017).
193. See id. at 285.
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is believed that by allowing those entities to take title then there will be a
sufficient incentive for them and transferees to invest in the commerciali-
zation of those inventions.194 Thus, even though the acts of invention,
including, perhaps, reduction to practice, are paid for by the government,
the entity can own the patent and extract a supracompetitive price assum-
ing, for example, the lack of non-infringing substitutes. Notably, universi-
ties are perhaps not equipped to commercialize inventions and
transferring those inventions to those that can will benefit the public. The
transfer often takes the form of a license agreement. There is significant
debate as to whether universities should license exclusively or non-exclu-
sively.195 Some universities have essentially agreed to prefer to license
inventions non-exclusively and only do so exclusively when necessary for
commercialization. Importantly, a non-exclusive license means that the
university may license the technology to others, which may undercut the
ability of the licensee to extract a supracompetitive price for the patented
technology. Of course, there may be less access to an invention with an
exclusive license. Moreover, some university created inventions may not
need to be commercialized, such as research tools196 and, in some cases,
software. This may depend on what the definition of commercialization
includes.
The Bayh-Dole Act also creates incentives for non-profit and univer-
sity researchers to disclose potentially patentable inventions by allowing
receipt of a portion of potential royalties from commercialized inven-
tions.197 Thus, non-profit and university researchers have a continued in-
terest in the success of the invention, which encourages their participation
in the commercialization of the government-funded invention. Some-
times researchers will team up with other professionals to commercialize
an invention through a university spin-off. The Act and regulations also
essentially allow the university to receive royalties from licensed inven-
tions that are commercialized.198 This provides an incentive for the uni-
versity to ensure that there is a technology transfer office within the
university and to create a system to ensure that patentable inventions are
disclosed.199 Ordinarily, universities tend to file provisional patent appli-
cations and allow licensees to cover the costs of a full patent application.
Additionally, the funding the university or non-profit receives is sup-
posed to be reinvested into research and development.200
194. Mireles, States as Innovation System Laboratories, supra note 3, at 1136.
195. See generally Ian Ayres & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, A Market Test for Bayh-Dole
Patents, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 271, 301–24 (2017) (discussing a market test for determining
whether to issue an exclusive or non-exclusive license for a government funded invention).
196. See Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Licensing, Research Tools, and
the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
141, 147 (2004).
197. See Flower, supra note 190, at 29; Mireles, States as Innovation System Laborato-
ries, supra note 3, at 1145–47.
198. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c) (2000); 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(k) (2013); Mireles, States as Inno-
vation System Laboratories, supra note 3, at 1145–46.
199. Mireles, States as Innovation System Laboratories, supra note 3, 1145–46.
200. See Flower, supra note 190, at 29.
534 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
The Bayh-Dole Act also contains numerous provisions designed to pro-
tect the public interest in government-funded technology. On the front
end, the government may deny patent rights in declared situations of “ex-
ceptional circumstances.”201 The government also retains a non-exclusive
license to the patented invention.202 Additionally, the government may
exercise “march-in” rights to essentially license the invention.203 Notably,
march-in rights have not been exercised since the passage of the Act.204
The argument against the exercise of march-in rights is that if they are
used, private entities are less likely to invest in the commercialization of
the invention in the first place, which would thwart one of the purposes of
the Act. Interestingly, price controls are believed not to be a valid reason
for invoking march-in rights.205 Moreover, an additional “safety valve” in
the Bayh-Dole Act may be university choice. For example, a university
may choose not to seek patent rights over certain technologies or in par-
ticular countries, and the U.S. government may agree.206 Professor Ouel-
lette has cautioned that university licensees may attempt to patent in
other countries, which raises a concern about access to inventions in
other countries.207 The U.S. government may choose to patent if the uni-
versity or grant recipient decides not to seek a patent.208
2. Critiques of the Bayh-Dole Act
There are many critiques of the Bayh-Dole Act.209 Two important criti-
201. 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2000).
202. Id. § 202(c)(4).
203. 35 U.S.C.A. § 203 (West 2011).
204. See Steven Seidenberg, US Perspectives: March-in Rights: A Lost Opportunity to
Lower US Drug Prices, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (May 18, 2017), https://www.ip-watch.org/
2017/05/18/march-rights-lost-opportunity-lower-us-drug-prices/ [https://perma.cc/2N5F-
EJ5K].
205. See John H. Raubitschek & Norman J. Latker, Reasonable Pricing—A New Twist
for March-in Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 149, 167 (2005) (“There is no reasonable pricing requirement under 35 U.S.C.
§ 203(1)(a)(1), considering the language of this section, the legislative history, and the
prior history and practice of march-in rights. Rather, this provision is to assure that the
contractor utilizes or commercializes the funded invention. However, that does not mean
that the price charged for a drug invented with Government funding is never of concern to
the funding agency. There are other mechanisms to address this concern, including the
health march-in authority of 35 U.S.C. § 203(1)(a)(2), the Government license in 35 U.S.C.
§ 202(c)(4), and eminent domain in 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).” (footnote omitted)).
206. See Flower, supra note 190, at 30–31.
207. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make a Drug?
Follow-on Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 299, 321 (2010) (“[P]ublic-sector institutions will need proactive licensing
terms to ensure that follow-on patents do not block access to the end products that are
needed by patients.”).
208. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(2) (2000).
209. For a discussion of the critiques of the Bayh-Dole Act, see generally Mireles, States
as Innovation System Laboratories, supra note 3, at 1147–78. An additional critique is that
universities are failing in technology transfer because there are many inventions that are
not commercialized. See Liza Vertinsky, Universities as Guardians of Their Inventions, 2012
UTAH L. REV. 1949, 1950 (“A growing number of promising university-generated inven-
tions are failing to reach the public in accessible and usable forms.”). Professor Vertinsky
also points to the additional problem that, “Even when university inventions reach the
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cisms include changing norms and the development of an anticommons.
An additional critique includes the compliance failure and the one-size-
fits-all nature of the Bayh-Dole Act.
One important criticism includes the shifting norms and research agen-
das in academia. Some have argued that the Bayh-Dole Act will incen-
tivize researchers to pursue agendas that are directed to applied research
instead of basic research.210 The evidence of this effect has been relatively
inconclusive.211 However, there has been movement towards further in-
centivizing researchers to move toward applied research and to at least
direct them to commercialization activities. For example, some universi-
ties have changed their tenure standards to include commercialization ef-
forts.212 The state of Ohio has considered legislation to expressly require
universities to consider commercialization activities in the tenure pro-
cess.213 Importantly, the legislation does not require commercialization
activities but considers that along with traditional factors.214 A university
technology transfer vendor also recently offered a webinar on changing
tenure standards at universities to include commercialization activities.215
As Professor Mark Lemley has noted, the problem is not necessarily that
existing researchers will change their practices but that new hires will
public, many cutting-edge discoveries remain underutilized because of restrictive patenting
and licensing practices. Prominent examples include restrictive patenting and licensing
practices for blockbuster AIDS drugs, stem cell technologies, and breast cancer genes.”
Vertinsky, supra, at 1951 (footnote omitted).
210. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 316 (2003) (“Being able to earn substantial income from
patent licensing has, it appears, induced universities to substitute away from basic research,
and the result may have been a net social loss.” (footnote omitted)); Eisenberg, supra note
187, at 1726; see also Pierre Azoulay, Waverly Ding & Toby Stuart, The Impact of Aca-
demic Patenting on the Rate, Quality, and Direction of (Public) Research 1 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11917, 2006), http://
www.nber.org/papers/w11917 [https://perma.cc/28WM-NW5Z] (“[S]urveys of academic
scientists have found that patenting skews scientists’ research agendas towards commercial
priorities, causes delay in the public dissemination of research findings, and crowds out
effort devoted to producing public research.” (citing David Blumenthal et al., Relationships
Between Academic Institutions and Industry in the Life Sciences—An Industry Survery, 334
NEW ENG. J. MED. 368 (1996); Eric G. Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic
Genetics—Evidence from a National Survey, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 473 (2002); SHELDON
KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HAS THE LURE OF PROFITS CORRUPTED
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? (2003))).
211. Mireles, States as Innovation System Laboratories, supra note 3, at 1168–69.
212. Paul R. Sanberg, Morteza Gharib, Patrick T. Harker, Eric W. Kaler, Richard B.
Marchase, Timothy D. Sands, Nasser Arshadi & Sudeep Sarkar, Changing the Academic
Culture: Valuing Patents and Commercialization Toward Tenure and Career Advancement,
111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6542, 6544 (2014) (“[Sixteen] United States and Canadian
universities . . . consider patents and commercialization in tenure and career advancement
decisions.”).
213. Rachel Abbey McCafferty, State Is Pushing Universities to Bring Research to Mar-
ket, CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUS. (Mar. 5, 2017, 1:30 AM), http://www.crainscleveland.com/
article/20170305/NEWS/170309909/state-is-pushing-universities-to-bring-research-to-mar-
ket?X-IgnoreUserAgent=1 [https://perma.cc/25U7-QN8A].
214. Id.
215. Mike Mireles, Basic Research—Soon to Be a Thing of the Past?, IP FIN. (Feb. 5,
2013), http://www.ip.finance/2013/02/basic-research-soon-to-be-thing-of-past.html?m=0
[https://perma.cc/G5Z6-VSUA].
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shift their agendas.216 Notably, combining changed tenure standards with
new hires could result in a culture shift that could shift agendas and result
in more commercialization activities.
The second critique includes the development of an anticommons or
patent thicket.217 Both theories essentially involve the problem of un-
deruse because of too many property rights and transaction costs.218 The
anticommons theory states that excessive property rights and high trans-
action costs may lead to the inability to combine rights to produce a par-
ticular product.219 The patent thicket is a similar theory that involves a
similar problem, also combined with overlapping rights.220 Both of these
problems could exist, for example, in biotechnology or software.
The evidence of the anticommons in biotechnology has been mixed;
although, there was some evidence of licensing hold-up with respect to
diagnostics.221 With respect to diagnostics, this has likely been resolved
by U.S. Supreme Court precedent concerning the patentability of some
diagnostics.222 Professor Mark Lemley has theorized that the field of na-
notechnology may experience underdevelopment because of early pat-
ents—many of them Bayh-Dole patents—on foundational technologies in
that area.223 Professor Emily Michiko Morris has argued that any slow-
down in development in nanotechnology should not be attributed to
those patents or an anticommons type problem but rather is because of
numerous factors, including issues concerning regulation for health and
safety, lack of expertise, and problems generating investment.224
A third possible critique concerns the Bayh-Dole Act’s one-size-fits-all
approach. In Policy Levers in Patent Law, Professors Dan Burk and Mark
Lemley essentially argue that because invention and innovation happen
differently in disparate industries, courts should adjust policy levers to
take into account those differences.225 Notably, the Bayh-Dole Act
adopts, for the most part, a one-size-fits-all approach to the patenting and
216. Lemley, Trolls, supra note 5, at 620–21.
217. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998). For a critique of the
theory, see Bruce N. Kuhlik & Richard A. Epstein, Navigating the Anticommons for Phar-
maceutical Patents: Steady the Course on Hatch-Waxman (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Chi.
Unbound Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 209, 2004), https://
chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?refererHTtps://www.google.com/&http-
sredir=1&article=1330&context=law_and_economics [Perma link unavailable].
218. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 217, at 698.
219. Id.
220. See generally Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent
Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B.
Jaffee et al. eds., 2001).
221. See Mireles, States as Innovation System Laboratories, supra note 3, at 1177.
222. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
223. See Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 601 (2005).
224. See Emily Michiko Morris, The Irrelevance of Nanotechnology Patents, 49 CONN.
L. REV. 499, 502–508 (2016).
225. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575 (2003); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009).
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licensing of government-funded invention. However, as noted by Profes-
sors Burk and Lemley, patents may be more important to invention and
innovation in industries such as pharmaceuticals, while in some indus-
tries, such as information technology and software, patents are not as im-
portant and may hinder innovation. Importantly, most patenting under
the Bayh-Dole Act occurred in the biopharmaceutical industry where
patents may provide a helpful incentive to commercialize by allowing the
recoupment of expensive costs such as paying to complete clinical testing
for efficacy and safety. Software, on the other hand, may not be well-
suited for patenting in the same way, particularly when involving mul-
ticomponent products. Indeed, the Bayh-Dole Act may not graft well
onto software and the commercialization rationale may be less important.
However, that may depend on how broadly commercialization is defined.
Under a broad definition that may include marketing, for example, the
Bayh-Dole Act may play a role. However, many software inventions may
cover just a part of an eventual invention and may not need additional
expenses such as marketing. Indeed, this is where patent trolls may pro-
vide a problem—when patents on software are used to “hold-up” an en-
tity that may have independently developed the invention. Arguably, the
approach of the licensor and licensee may result in terms that can be
tailored to a particular industry’s patent and commercialization needs.
However, as Professor Lisa Larrimore Ouellette has pointed out, a patent
may not be necessary under the Bayh-Dole Act for non-exclusively li-
censed inventions in the first place.226 Essentially, evidence that the entity
chose to non-exclusively license means that a patent is not necessary for
commercialization.227
In Do University Patents Pay Off? Evidence from a Survey of Univer-
sity Inventors in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, Professor
Love surveyed “2,387 tenured and tenure-track faculty members affili-
ated with the nation’s top twenty [electrical and computer engineering]
and [computer science] departments.”228 He received “a sample of 269
responses, for an overall response rate of 11.3%.”229 He states that, “If
university tech transfer programs fail to successfully carry out their mis-
sion at these [top] schools, they very likely also fail to do so at lower-
ranked schools.”230 It would be helpful for additional research to be con-
ducted with a larger sample of schools with different rankings. Indeed,
the shifting state of patent eligible subject matter in the United States
may have resulted in fewer resources dedicated toward patenting and li-
censing in this field. While the response rate was relatively low, the over-
226. Ian Ayres & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, A Market Test for Bayh-Dole Patents, 102
CORNELL L. REV. 271, 275 (2017).
227. Id.
228. Brian J. Love, Do University Patents Pay Off? Evidence from a Survey of Univer-
sity Inventors in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 285,
296 (2014) (footnote omitted).
229. Id. at 299.
230. Id. at 297.
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all finding appears to be that, instead of furthering innovation, “patenting
high-tech university research may fail a cost-benefit analysis.”231 In par-
ticular, he notes that universities are garnering “a negative rate of return
. . . on funds invested in high-tech patenting.”232 Unfortunately, this find-
ing seems to be generally aligned with research showing that technology
transfer offices tend to not make enough funds to sustain themselves. Ad-
ditionally, “[e]ighty-five percent of professors report” that they are not
considering patents when deciding and considering research.233 As pat-
enting is relatively new in the software and telecommunications area in
academia, faculty in that field may not have been well-educated about
patents and licensing. However, only “13.7% of respondents reported
that they did not know whether their home institutions have a policy of
sharing royalties with faculty.”234 Moreover, Professor Love points to a
finding that 50% of respondents who knew of the policy did not know the
share amount.235 This seems to demonstrate that the respondents do not
know the exact amount, but they may understand that the possibility of
royalties exists.
Professor Love further states that, “University patent programs may,
instead, actually reduce the quantity and quality of university research in
high-tech fields by harming professors’ ability to obtain research funding,
to collaborate with faculty from other institutions, and to disseminate
their work to colleagues.”236 Older studies seem to indicate that issues
with respect to collaboration and dissemination may not exist; however,
those studies were mostly focused on the biotechnology field.237 Finally,
he reports that “[e]ntrepreneurial professors report that these programs
hinder their ability to work as consultants with companies that show in-
terest in their research, and fewer than half of university spin-off foun-
ders report that the ability to patent their research affirmatively helped
their commercialization efforts.”238 The latter response may be explained
based on the fact that the academics were questioned rather than more
business-oriented members of a spin-off.
A final critique of the Bayh-Dole Act includes a compliance failure by
231. Id. at 294.
232. Id. at 294–95.
233. Id. at 295. This response may evolve as norms change.
234. Id. at 317.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 286. Notably, he states,
Among respondents who had founded a startup, presumably those who had
“benefited” the most from university patent rights, thirty-four percent indi-
cated that patents harmed their ability to obtain research funding, thirty-four
percent indicated that patents hindered their ability to collaborate with other
researchers, and twenty-nine percent indicated that patents harmed their
ability to disseminate their ideas, compared to just twenty-two, four, and
twelve percent, respectively, who indicated that patents helped in each
category.
Id. at 320.
237. Id. at 287–89.
238. Id. at 286.
2018] Monitoring Behavior 539
grantees of research funding.239 The Bayh-Dole Act includes many re-
porting and tracking requirements by grant recipients, including requiring
a statement of government interest in patents of government-funded in-
vention.240 However, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) has
stated that universities and other recipients of funding are underreporting
at a relatively high rate.241 This makes tracking the number of publicly-
funded patented inventions difficult. Moreover, as discussed supra, this
means that our reporting on government-funded inventions is likely less
than what actually exists. Recently, the National Institutes of Health, fol-
lowing recent regulatory changes, has led a movement to ensure that
grant recipients are complying with the Bayh-Dole Act requirements and
regulations.242
3. University Patent Litigation: Prior Research and Self-Regulation
Several studies concerning university patent litigation exist. This sec-
tion describes some of those studies. Professor Jacob Rooksby has au-
thored several studies concerning university patent litigation. Professors
Scott Shane and Deepak Somaya have also authored an article concern-
ing the effects of patent litigation. Professor Rai provided a first look at
litigation involving software. Additionally, several studies discuss univer-
sity patent litigation in the context of patent litigation generally. For ex-
ample, the PriceWaterhouseCooper Patent Litigation Studies present
numerous findings that compare general NPE patent litigation to univer-
sity and non-profit litigation. Furthermore, academia and universities
have attempted to regulate and limit patent litigation by universities.
a. University Patent Litigation Generally
Professor Rooksby’s 2011 paper University Initiation of Patent Infringe-
ment Litigation examines “every patent infringement lawsuit and associ-
ated complaint filed by universities in the two-year period from January
1, 2009 through December 31, 2010.”243 Professor Rooksby searched the
239. Arti K. Rai & Bhaven N. Sampat, Accountability in Patenting of Federally Funded
Research, 30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 953, 954 (2012) (discussing the significant failure
to comply with reporting requirements).
240. 35 U.S.C.A. § 202(c)(6) (West 2011); 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(f)(4) (2013).
241. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO 99-242, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: REPORT-
ING REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERALLY SPONSORED INVENTIONS NEED REVISION 2–14
(1999).
242. See NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NOT-OD-16-066, REMINDER: ALL SUBJECT INVEN-
TIONS MUST BE REPORTED ON THE HHS 568–FINAL INVENTION STATEMENT AND CERTIFI-
CATION (FOR GRANT OR AWARD) AND IN IEDISON (2016), https://archives.nih.gov/asites/
grants/01-17-2017/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-16-066.html [https://perma.cc/Q872-
V9GD]; see also GOODWIN, CHANGES TO BAYH-DOLE ACT REGULATIONS IMPACTING
OWNERSHIP OF PATENT RIGHTS (2017), http://www.goodwinlaw.com/publications/2017/04/
04_10_17-changes-to-bayh-dole-act-regulations-impa [Perma link unavailable] (discussing
changes to Bayh-Dole Act regulations that place potential cloud over title to government
funded inventions).
243. Jacob H. Rooksby, University Initiation of Patent Infringement Litigation, 10 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 623, 625 (2011).
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Derwent LitAlert database.244 Notably, Professor Rooksby states that the
results of the search could be underinclusive because of limitations with
the Derwent LitAlert database, which contains self-reported cases by dis-
trict court clerks.245 Professor Rooksby then used PACER and “the
LexMachina database maintained by the Intellectual Property Litigation
Clearinghouse” to pull the complaints from each case.246 Professor Rook-
sby identified fifty-seven complaints meeting the criteria of a university
initiated patent infringement law suit.247 He collected the following
information:
case number; the jurisdiction in which the lawsuit was filed; the name
of the lead plaintiff; the names and total number of any co-plaintiffs;
the names and total number of all defendants; the number of patents
alleged in the complaint; the general type of technology covered by
the patents in suit; the specific type of technology covered by the
patents in suit; the name of any lead outside counsel firm listed on
the complaint as representing the university; whether the plaintiff(s)
had demanded that the case be tried to a jury; whether the plain-
tiff(s) sought monetary damages; [whether there was an exclusive li-
cense or nonexclusive license;] and whether the lawsuit appeared to
have been filed in a strategic venue.248
Some of Professor Rooksby’s findings include that “universities as-
serted 125 different patents in 57 patent infringement lawsuits”; “pharma-
ceutical and medical devices were the most frequently litigated patents,
having been litigated in over 50% of the cases”; litigation was filed in the
District of Delaware in “nearly a third of the located lawsuits”; and 75%
of the cases involved an exclusive license.249 Professor Rooksby also drew
the following conclusions from the data: “some universities are repeat
initiators of patent infringement litigation,” and “universities’ behavior in
patent infringement litigation mimics the strategic behavior of for-profit
actors involved in such litigation.”250 He also notes that in at least six
cases the university strategically selected the venue and that some univer-
sities were joined as plaintiffs even though it appeared unnecessary for
their joinder.251
In Innovation and Litigation: Tensions Between Universities and Patents
and How to Fix Them, Professor Rooksby expands his review of univer-
sity initiated patent litigation from 1973 to 2012.252 He follows a similar
research approach to that described above: review of the Derwent
LitAlert and an accompanying analysis of the complaints via LexMachina
244. Id. at 650.
245. Id. at 651.
246. Id. at 650–52.
247. Id. at 652.
248. Id. at 653 (footnote omitted).
249. Id. at 660.
250. Id. at 661.
251. Id. at 663–65.
252. Jacob H. Rooksby, Innovation and Litigation: Tensions Between Universities and
Patents and How to Fix Them, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 312, 335–40 (2013).
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and PACER.253 He identified 284 cases of university initiated patent in-
fringement lawsuits.254 While the number of universities participating and
initiating lawsuits did not rise year by year, Professor Rooksby notes that
“both metrics are trending upward, with significant growth noted begin-
ning in the year 2000.”255 Professor Rooksby also conducted a qualitative
study surveying university chief research officers concerning their deci-
sion-making in initiating patent infringement lawsuits.256
In a qualitative study, When Tigers Bare Teeth: A Qualitative Study of
University Patent Enforcement, Professor Rooksby again examines deci-
sion-making in initiating patent infringement lawsuits.257 He collected
data from five high-level technology transfer professionals at public uni-
versities through interviews and relied on informal interviews and obser-
vations from meetings at an AUTM meeting.258 Professor Rooksby noted
several “revelations and suggestions” from his data gathering process:
Litigation As Mission-Enhancing: Some universities view participa-
tion as plaintiffs in patent infringement litigation as condoned or
even mandated by their research and commercialization missions,
despite what some critics view as the activity’s incompatibility with
the notion of a university’s public-serving mission.
Money As Motivator: Revenue generation is often a principal mo-
tivator for universities that choose to enforce their patents through
infringement litigation, even though industry literature only indi-
rectly touts litigation’s revenue-generating potential.
Structural Deterrents: The high cost of legal fees, concern for be-
ing viewed as overly litigious, and reputational risks related to con-
tingency fee arrangements with outside law firms provide
disincentives for some universities contemplating pursuit of patent
infringers.
Fear of Retribution: The identity of would-be defendants may
cause some institutions to abandon pursuit of their infringement
claims out of concern for retribution to the university, particularly
with respect to sponsored research funding.
Litigation Realities Driving Licensing Decisions: Concern for the
responsibility and costs involved in litigating non-exclusively licensed
patents may lead some institutions to favor an exclusive licensing
strategy for their patents, on the belief that doing so will save them
253. Id. at 336.
254. Id. at 337. Notably, Professor Rooksby limited inclusion by two additional criteria:
(1) “[he] excluded any case where a university was added as a plaintiff after commence-
ment of the action”; and (2) “[he] excluded cases in which universities levied infringement
allegations from a defensive posture (such as in response to a declaratory judgment ac-
tion).” Id. at 337. He added these criteria because he desired to err on the side of underre-
porting “the number of universities that have litigated patents and the number of patent
infringement lawsuits with universities as plaintiffs.” Id.
255. Id. at 339–40.
256. Id. at 341–43.
257. Jacob H. Rooksby, When Tigers Bare Teeth: A Qualitative Study of University Pat-
ent Enforcement, 46 AKRON L. REV. 169, 171–72 (2013).
258. Id.
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money and may even spare their involvement as a plaintiff in any
infringement action.
Litigating Unlicensed Patents: Although many universities may be
hesitant to litigate unlicensed patents, shrewd companies have de-
vised a way for them to turn unlicensed patents into putatively li-
censed ones, thereby contravening the Bayh-Dole Act’s purposes
and masking the character of what some may view as speculative
enforcement activity.
Some of Professor Rooksby’s findings are further supported by the
analysis of Professor Jay Kesan. In 2009, Professor Kesan essentially con-
cluded that “university technology transfer activities continue to be
predominantly patent-centric and revenue-driven with a single-minded
focus on generating licensing income and obtaining reimbursement for
legal expenses.”259
In The Effects of Patent Litigation on University Licensing Efforts,
Professors Scott Shane and Deepak Somaya examine the impact of pat-
ent litigation on university licensing of “116 leading U.S. research univer-
sities from 1991 through 2000.”260 The study uses information from
“interviews with the directors of technology licensing offices at 13 Car-
negie I research universities to understand what effect patent litigation
has on technology licensing office operations.”261 The study also “ana-
lyze[s] quantitative data from an annual survey of university TLOs . . .
combine[d] with a dataset of university patent litigation.”262 The authors
find that,
[Their] interviews and statistical analyses show consistent patterns.
Patent litigation imposes important costs on university licensing ac-
tivity and significantly reduces the number of new licenses executed.
[Their] interviews suggest that this is because litigation disrupts TLO
activity and reduces the time and resource available to market tech-
nologies and form licensing agreements. . . .
The TLO directors were unanimous that university-led patent litiga-
tion caused a significant dislocation in the operation of the technol-
ogy licensing office. . . . Licensing officers must typically collect and
organize records so that they may be made available during the dis-
covery phase of litigation. They must coordinate between the inven-
tor, university administration, and legal counsel (both in house and
external). They must provide depositions and answer interrogatories.
This highlights an important aspect of the cost of patent litigation: it
draws upon the time and attention of licensing officers, who are a
259. See Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2169 (2009).
While some universities may have moved from innovators to rent-seeking, Professor Rob-
ert Merges cautions that an “overreaction,” such as banning university licensing, may be
worse overall than “no reaction . . . because universities continue to generate important,
horizon-stretching technologies.” See Merges, Trouble with Trolls, supra note 5, at 1611.
260. See Scott Shane & Deepak Somaya, The Effects of Patent Litigation on University
Licensing Efforts, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 739, 740 (2007).
261. Id.
262. Id.
2018] Monitoring Behavior 543
key resource in university technology licensing offices.263
Notably, the authors state “that the reduction in licensing that occurs in
response to university patent litigation stems primarily from exclusive li-
censes, which are disproportionately signed with new and small firms.”264
The authors conclude that this may thwart part of the Bayh-Dole Act’s
purpose in aiding small and new firms.265
b. Literature on University Software Patents and Litigation
In an example of a study on university software patents and litigation,
Professor Arti K. Rai, John R. Allison, and Bhaven N. Sampat “re-
veal[ed] that software patents represent a significant and growing propor-
tion of university patent holdings.”266 The authors found that,
First, software patents represent a significant and growing percent-
age of university patent holdings. Second, university software patent-
ing practices tend to mimic their nonsoftware patenting practices.
The data suggests that those universities that have a higher patent
propensity in general are also more likely to obtain software patents.
Similarly, our interviews show that some universities view software
as similar to other, more physical inventions. The difficulty with this
view is that software is likely to follow a different commercialization
path than other inventions. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that we
see a fair number of litigated cases involving software patents, and
that almost all of these appear to represent situations where the uni-
versity and/or its exclusive licensee is asserting the patent against an
entity that has successfully commercialized software independent of
the patent. Notably, in the majority of these cases, the university’s
argument has lost on grounds of either patent invalidity or
noninfringement.267
In looking forward, the authors point to the fact that some universities
will take an open source approach to licensing software or will forgo en-
tering into exclusive licenses for software, particularly pure software.268
The authors apparently believed that licensing allowing more access and
legal developments may mitigate some of the harm from university
software patenting.269
c. General Studies Partially Covering University Patent Litigation
Several general studies of patent litigation present information con-
cerning university patent litigation. For example, Price-
WaterhouseCooper has conducted numerous studies concerning patent
263. Id. at 740–41, 746.
264. Id. at 754.
265. Id.
266. Arti K. Rai, John R. Allison & Bhaven N. Sampat, University Software Ownership
and Litigation: A First Examination, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1519, 1519–26 (2009).
267. Id. at 1525.
268. Id. at 1557–65.
269. See id.
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litigation, including NPE litigation. In its 2014 Patent Litigation Study,
PriceWaterhouseCooper found that “[w]hile company NPEs are awarded
higher damages, university/nonprofit NPEs have by far the highest suc-
cess rate among NPEs [45%].”270 In its 2016 Patent Litigation Study, it
found that “[u]niversities/non-profits do not litigate as often as other NPE
types; however, when they do, they have both higher success rates and
median damages.”271 Out of nineteen cases, universities and non-profits
prevailed in nine cases for a fourty-seven percent success rate.272 The me-
dian damages awarded from 1996 to 2015 for universities and non-profits
was $16.3 million.273
d. Self-Regulation by Universities
There are several examples of how universities have attempted to self-
regulate and control licensing and litigation conduct.274 One example is
the In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University
Technology (Nine Points to Consider) document.275 Additionally, Chris-
topher Larus, John K. Harting, and Sharon Roberg-Perez authored a pa-
per explaining how university licensors can control litigation decisions in
the future through licensing and assignment terms.276 Universities may
adopt similar approaches to those described in the article to reduce the
likelihood of troll-like enforcement efforts.
The Nine Points to Consider document was drafted by twelve leading
academic institutions and has been adopted by over seventy academic in-
stitutions from around the world.277 Some of those institutions include
Northwestern University, University of New Hampshire, University of
Delaware, The University of Texas at Austin, University of Nebraska,
University of Pennsylvania, University of Southern California, Boston
University, University of Florida, University of California, Wisconsin
270. See PWC 2014 PATENT STUDY, supra note 86, at 20.
271. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, 2016 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 11 (2016),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2016-pwc-patent-
litigation-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WUF-2X8Q] [hereinafter PWC 2016 PATENT
STUDY].
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Professor David E. Winickoff discusses how efforts such as the Nine Points to Con-
sider document—attempting to make university generated innovations available to devel-
oping countries—and the collection of data to demonstrate the impact of university
technology transfer are welcome moves to recognize the public nature of university tech-
nology transfer. See David E. Winickoff, Private Assets, Public Mission: The Politics of
Technology Transfer and the New American University, 54 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 30–42 (2013).
275. See ASS’N UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: NINE POINTS TO
CONSIDER IN LICENSING UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY (2007), https://www.autm.net/AUTM-
Main/media/Advocacy/Documents/Points_to_Consider.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NB4-FTQN]
[hereinafter NINE POINTS TO CONSIDER].
276. Christopher Larus, John K. Harting & Sharon Roberg-Perez, Patent Licensing and
Assignment with an Eye Toward Enforcement: Tips for University Patent Owners, 48 LES
NOUVELLES 13, 13 (2013) [hereinafter Tips for University].
277. See Nine Points to Consider, ASS’N U. TECH. MANAGERS, https://www.autm.net/
advocacy-topics/government-issues/principles-and-guidelines/nine-points-to-consider-
when-licensing-university/# [https://perma.cc/7Z8N-NJGX].
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Alumni Research Foundation, California Institute of Technology, Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology, and Stanford University.278 Notably, sig-
natories include universities outside the United States such as Australian
National University, University of Ottawa, Dublin Institute of Technol-
ogy–Hothouse, Tokyo University of Science, Universidad Nacional
Autonoma de Mexico, and University of Copenhagen.279 Several major
“umbrella” organizations purportedly representing numerous institutions
and entities are also signatories: Association of Public and Land-grant
Universities, Biotechnology Industry Organization, Association of Amer-
ican Medical Colleges, Association of University Technology Managers,
and Association of American Universities.280
The Nine Points to Consider document attempts to balance the public
interest and role of the university in licensing university generated tech-
nology.281 The Nine Points include:
• Point 1: Universities should reserve the right to practice licensed
inventions and to allow other non-profit and governmental organi-
zations to do so
• Point 2: Exclusive licenses should be structured in a manner that
encourages technology development and use
• Point 3: Strive to minimize the licensing of “future improvements”
• Point 4: Universities should anticipate and help to manage technol-
ogy transfer related conflicts of interest
• Point 5: Ensure broad access to research tools
• Point 6: Enforcement action should be carefully considered
• Point 7: Be mindful of export regulations
• Point 8: Be mindful of the implications of working with patent
aggregators
• Point 9: Consider including provisions that address unmet needs,
such as those of neglected patient populations or geographic areas,
giving particular attention to improved therapeutics, diagnostics
and agricultural technologies for the developing world282
For the purposes of this article, Point 6, concerning enforcement, and
Point 8, relating to working with patent aggregators, are particularly im-
portant.283 Point 6 specifically reminds universities to tread carefully
when making decisions to enforce their rights through litigation brought
by the institution as well as in influencing the decisions of licensees.284
Universities should keep in mind their missions as well as the public in-
terest.285 The Nine Points to Consider document provides examples of
when litigation may be appropriate, but it specifically cautions that
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. NINE POINTS TO CONSIDER, supra note 275, at 1.
282. Id. at 2–8.
283. Id. at 6–8.
284. Id. at 6.
285. Id.
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“[u]nder all circumstances, it reflects poorly on universities to be involved
in ‘nuisance suits.’”286 Moreover, “[e]xclusive licensees should be en-
couraged to approach patent enforcement in a manner that is consistent
with the philosophy described in this Point 6.”287
Point 8 concerns universities and their potential relationship with pat-
ent aggregators.288 Point 8 makes a distinction between two types of ag-
gregators.289 First, there are the aggregators who operate by “adding
value” through combining numerous patents in portfolios for licensing a
packaged technology.290 Second, there are aggregators specifically re-
ferred to as patent trolls “who acquire rights that cut broadly across one
or more technological fields with no real intention of commercializing the
technologies.”291 The Nine Points to Consider document specifically
states,
In the extreme case, this kind of aggregator approaches companies
with a large bundle of patent rights with the expectation that they
license the entire package on the theory that any company that oper-
ates in the relevant field(s) must be infringing at least one of the
hundreds, or even thousands, of included patents. Daunted by the
prospect of committing the human and financial resources needed to
perform due diligence sufficient to establish their freedom to operate
under each of the bundled patents, many companies in this situation
will conclude that they must pay for a license that they may not need.
Unlike the original patent owner, who has created the technology
and so is reasonably entitled to some economic benefit in recognition
for its innovative contribution, the commercial licensee who ad-
vances the technology prior to sublicensing, or the added value ag-
gregator who helps overcome legal barriers to product development,
the kind of aggregator described in this paragraph typically extracts
payments in the absence of any enhancement to the licensed technol-
ogy. Without delving more deeply into the very real issues of patent
misuse and bad-faith dealing by such aggregators, suffice it to say
that universities would better serve the public interest by ensuring
appropriate use of their technology by requiring their licensees to
operate under a business model that encourages commercialization
and does not rely primarily on threats of infringement litigation to
generate revenue.292
Notably, several of the institutions that have signed the Nine Points to
Consider document have also supposedly entered into agreements with
Intellectual Ventures, as discussed by Professors Robin Feldman and Tom
Ewing.293 Intellectual Ventures must be considered an “added-value”
patent aggregator as opposed to a troll by those institutions. Indeed, In-
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 7.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 7–8.
293. Feldman & Ewing, Giants, supra note 50, at 13–36.
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tellectual Ventures in some ways resembles a university because it hires
scientists to engage in research leading to patents.
Universities can also adopt licensing terms that give them more control
over downstream litigation decisions. For example, Christopher Larus,
John K. Harting, and Sharon Roberg-Perez have provided numerous rec-
ommendations for retaining the ability to control or influence litigation
decisions by licensees.294 Importantly, the authors highlight the impor-
tance of making the decision to control or not control litigation ini-
tially.295 Moreover, the key to retaining the ability to control litigation
depends on the rights retained by the licensor university.296 Universities
can make the decision to retain substantial rights enabling them to con-
trol or be involved in litigation involving patents covering technology de-
veloped at their institutions.297
4. Universities as the Privileged Class in U.S. Patent Litigation
In recent scholarship, Professors Shubha Ghosh and Peter Lee have
pointed to the privileged status of universities under U.S. patent law, par-
ticularly legislation.298 There are several statutory advantages that have
been provided to universities. And, indeed, universities and AUTM have
lobbied for specific protections for university patents.299 Moreover, a re-
cent Patent Trial and Appeals Board decision grants public universities
immunity from inter partes review proceedings.
The Bayh-Dole Act is an example of how patent-related legislation has
shifted toward favoring universities.300 As discussed supra, the Bayh-
Dole Act allows patenting even when research for invention has been
paid for by the government. This upends the traditional and primary ra-
tionale for patents, which is the inventive to invent theory. The Bayh-
Dole Act, for the most part, relies upon the commercialization theory to
justify allowing patents on government-funded invention. Moreover, uni-
versities receive “micro entity” status.301 This allows universities to pay
significantly lower fees, which incentivizes them to take advantage of pat-
enting. Additionally, the AIA retains the grace period, which benefits ac-
ademic researchers who publish their work by not allowing it to serve as
prior art.302
Professor Lee also points to the Cooperative Research and Technology
Enhancement Act of 2004, which was designed to facilitate collaborations
between the industry and universities by modifying the law of nonobvi-
294. Tips for University, supra note 276, at 13–21.
295. Id. at 15–20.
296. Id. at 15–16.
297. Id.
298. See Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 1 (2013). Professor Lee
analyzes how patent case law has not recognized “academic exceptionalism.” Id. at 51–63;
Shubha Ghosh, Are Universities Special?, 49 AKRON L. REV. 671, 671 (2016).
299. See Lee, supra note 298, at 63–75.
300. Id. at 64–66.
301. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 123(d) (West 2013); see also Lee, supra note 298, at 74–75.
302. Lee, supra note 298, at 69–71.
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ousness.303 Additionally, the AIA includes expanded prior user rights,
which provide a defense to a patent infringement cause of action.304 Im-
portantly, the defense also applies to “[a] use of subject matter by a non-
profit research laboratory or other nonprofit entity, . . . for which the
public is the intended beneficiary, shall be deemed to be a commercial
use.”305 Not only are certain uses by non-profits included within the de-
fense, there is a specific “university exception.”306 The university excep-
tion does not allow the defense to apply to commercial uses by a person
who “at the time the invention was made, owned or subject to an obliga-
tion of assignment to either an institution of higher education . . . or a
technology transfer organization whose primary purpose is to facilitate
the commercialization of technologies developed by one or more such
institutions of higher education.”307 This privileges universities and non-
profits by removing the prior commercial use defense against patent in-
fringement. Notably, this is particularly troubling in the following narra-
tive: Company A independently develops technology and uses it
commercially in a secret way. University develops the same technology
and patents it. University brings an action against Company A. Company
A cannot raise prior user rights under the statute.
Professor Ghosh points to proposed legislation directed at patent trolls
that “protects universities as patent enforcers.”308 For example, Professor
Ghosh states,
Proposed patent reform seeks to punish entities that simply accumu-
late patent portfolios with no intent to commercialize or practice the
patented technologies, but instead have the intent to initiate patent
infringement suits that will result in settlements. Proposals for curb-
ing these frivolous lawsuits include heightened pleading standards,
automatically awarding attorney’s fees if the non-practicing entity
loses the lawsuit, and requirements of specificity in both pleading
and in any cease and desist letters sent prior to initiation of litigation.
Advocates for universities have sought a carve-out for these pro-
posed reforms on the theory that while universities may not commer-
cialize patents, their intent in acquiring a patent portfolio is not to
bring frivolous litigation. The advocates’ implied argument is even
stronger: that patent litigation brought by universities would almost
certainly not be frivolous and pursued solely for settlement value.
Consequently, patent reform would inappropriately characterize uni-
versities as patent trolls and unfairly increase their burden for pro-
303. Id. at 65–67.
304. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 273 (West 2011).
305. Id. § 273(c)(2); see Lee, supra note 298, at 71–73; Ghosh, supra note 298, at
689–91.
306. See Lee, supra note 298, at 71–73.
307. 35 U.S.C.A. § 273(e)(5)(A) (West 2011) (footnote omitted). This provision is sub-
ject to an exception: the university exemption will “not apply if any of the activities re-
quired to reduce to practice the subject matter of the claimed invention could not have
been undertaken using funds provided by the Federal Government.” Id. § 273(e)(5)(B).
308. See Ghosh, supra note 298, at 692 (citing Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong.
(2015)).
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tecting legitimate patent rights as compared to commercial patent
owners.309
In recent decisions, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) ex-
tended 11th Amendment constitutional immunity to public universities
from inter partes review. In Covidien LP v. University of Florida Re-
search Foundation Inc., the PTAB analogized inter partes review to pat-
ent infringement and essentially decided that entities cannot bring actions
against universities to have their patents invalidated in an inter partes
proceeding.310
B. NON-PROFITS
The Bayh-Dole Act applies to non-profits. Notably, non-profits who
are not universities, such as foundations, are licensing and litigating pat-
ents. This category does not include universities or non-profits formed by
universities to license and enforce patents. An example of an entity not
covered by our definition of non-profits includes the Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation.
C. FOREIGN UNIVERSITIES
As discussed supra, the Bayh-Dole Act has been adopted throughout
the world. Indeed, countries from the EU to India to China have adopted
legislation similar to Bayh-Dole. It is unclear whether the same impact in
the United States will be experienced in other countries. At least one
study finds relatively substantial patenting by academic institutions
outside the United States in their home countries.311 However, foreign
universities are also likely obtaining patent rights in the United States
given the size of the U.S. market; and, those universities will likely en-
force those patents. Indeed, the National Academy of Inventors and the
Intellectual Property Owners Association released the Top 100 World-
wide Universities Granted U.S. Utility Patents 2016, which lists around 30
non-U.S.-based universities in the top 100 patenting universities in the
309. Id. at 692–93 (footnotes omitted).
310. See No. IPR2016-01274, 2017 WL 4015009, at *7 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017). How-
ever, a PTAB split of decisions appears to minimize the ability of licensees of university
patents to avoid an IPR challenge in cases with co-owners. See Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP
v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2017-00572, 2017 WL 2992435, at *5 (P.T.A.B. July 13,
2017); see also Lucas Dahlin, Sovereign Immunity Cannot Protect Patent Co-Owned by
Private Party, MONDAQ, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/626756/Patent/Sover-
eign+Immunity+Cannot+Protect+Patent+CoOwned£y+Private+Party [https://perma.cc/
U47S-Q7SB] (last updated Sept. 7, 2017) (“Universities and other state actors should be
aware that co-owning a patent with a private party leaves the patent susceptible to IPR
challenges. It may behoove such state actors to completely own their patents to protect
against post-grant challenges.”).
311. For an example of a study concerning academic patenting in other countries, see
Pluvia Zuniga, The State of Patenting at Research Institutions in Developing Countries: Pol-
icy Approaches and Practices (World Intellectual Prop. Org. Econ. Research Working Pa-
pers, Working Paper No. 4, 2011), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/
wipo_pub_econstat_wp_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5Y8-ZBVH].
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United States.312 The top 10 non-U.S.-based universities include
Tsinghua University/Graduate School at Shenzen, Tsinghua University
(181 patents); Korea Institute of Science and Technology (100 patents);
King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals (90 patents); National
Tsing Hua University (80 patents); Korea Advanced Institute of Science
and Technology (77 patents); National Taiwan University/National Tai-
wan University Hospital (65 patents); King Saud University (58 patents);
Industry-Academic Cooperation at Yonsei University (57 patents);
Ramot at Tel Aviv University LTD (54 patents); and National Chiao Tung
University (53 patents).313 For some context, the entire University of Cal-
ifornia system had 505 patents.314 Harvard College, President and Fel-
lows had 104 patents.315 Duke University had 60 patents.316 The
University of Southern California had 51 patents.317 Carnegie-Mellon
University had 31 patents and Texas A&M had 35 patents.318
Notably, those patents will likely not be covered by similar exemptions
allowing potential use such as march-in rights exercisable by the United
States government. However, all U.S. patents are subject to a “takings”
type clause.319 Moreover, the above-listed foreign universities have not
signed the Nine Points to Consider document.
IV. REASONS FOR CONCERN, THE EFF, AND
RICHARD EPSTEIN
This Part discusses the reasons for concern for the future of university
patenting, licensing, and litigation. This Part also reviews the controversy
between the EFF and Professor Richard Epstein.
A. REASONS FOR CONCERN
The main factor preventing additional litigation by universities and
non-profits is likely reputational. Universities serve multiple constituen-
cies and are likely to be concerned with aggravating potential donors,
alumni, students, and the general public. An example of university and
non-profit concern with reputation includes the public outcry involving
the University of California system enrolling many foreign students and
out-of-state students to increase revenue instead of admitting additional
312. See NAT’L ACAD. OF INV’RS, TOP 100 WORLDWIDE UNIVERSITIES GRANTED U.S.
UTILITY PATENTS 2016 (2017), www.academyofinventors.com/pdf/top-100-universities-
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/83TK-99JM].
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2012) (“(a) Whenever an invention described in and covered
by a patent of the United States is used or manufactured by or for the United States with-
out license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the
owner’s remedy shall be by action against the United States . . . for the recovery of his
reasonable and entire compensation for such use and manufacture.”).
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in-state residents.320 Specifically, with respect to intellectual property,
Yale University made the decision to alter its approach to licensing and
access to a particular type of pharmaceutical.321 Indeed, as found by Pro-
fessor Rooksby, universities are concerned with reputation in making the
decision to litigate patents.322 Indeed, the EFF has attempted to use uni-
versity concern with reputation to shame universities who license patents
to trolls.323 However, there is a movement—intentional or not—to revise
the way academia has generally operated to accommodate technology
transfer, increase public/private collaboration, and move toward universi-
ties acting more in line with for-profit corporations. Indeed, Professor
Brian L. Frye and Christopher J. Ryan, Jr. find that universities are be-
having similarly to private firms in response to legislative changes con-
cerning patents.324 Shaming may not be enough.
There is some cause for concern for the future. For example, there are
several factors that make it likely that universities will engage in even
more litigation in the future and may seek to license to so-called patent
trolls. Moreover, the complicated and continuing evolution of the role of
the university raises broader concerns. Additionally, the campaign by the
EFF and debate with Professor Richard Epstien bring these concerns into
sharp relief. This debate will likely lead to an attempt to reshape the
larger debate about the role of universities.325 Essentially, the argument
may become that public universities entrusted with public funding must
bring research to the public, and patent litigation is one way to ensure
recoupment of public monies.
Some factors may lead to an increase in patent litigation: First, the U.S.
federal government could substantially decrease funding for university
research. Indeed, the Trump Administration’s budget includes cutbacks
320. See Teresa Watanabe, UC Proposes Its First Enrollment Cap—20%—on out-of-
State Students, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017, 11:15 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/
la-me-ln-uc-limit-nonresident-students-20170306-story.html [https://perma.cc/TMS7-
MUYU] (“A scathing state audit . . . found that UC was hurting California students by
admitting too many out-of-state applicants.”).
321. See Timothy B. Lee, University Patents Limit Access to Medicine. These Students
Want to Change That., WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-switch/wp/2013/11/22/university-patents-limit-access-to-medicine-these-students-
want-to-change-that/?utm_term=.5f251ca586fc [https://perma.cc/GG6N-L8R7]; see gener-
ally Amy Kapczynski, Samantha Chaifetz, Zachary Katz & Yochai Benkler, Addressing
Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovation, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1034–37 (2005).
322. See infra Part III.
323. See Daniel Nazer, Stupid Patent of the Month: Storing Files in Folders, ELEC-
TRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.: DEEPLINKS BLOG (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deep-
links/2017/03/stupid-patent-month-storing-files-folders [https://perma.cc/2GLG-LKM7]
(“Louisiana Tech [University] sold the ‘532 patent to Micoba LLC, a company that has all
the indicia of a classic patent troll.”).
324. Christopher J. Ryan, Jr. & Brian L. Frye, An Empirical Study of University Patent
Activity, 7 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENTER. L. 51, 51 (2017).
325. Scholars are already calling for more discretion on the part of universities on how
inventions are utilized. See, e.g., Vertinsky, supra note 209, at 2021 (“These changes are
directed at increasing the discretion, responsibility, and accountability of universities in
selecting and managing post-discovery development choices for their inventions.”).
552 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
in research funding, including funding for the National Institutes of
Health.326 Thus, there is increased pressure on universities to find alter-
native funding sources. Second, most technology transfer offices are not
making enough money to sustain themselves.327 It is likely that they will
continue to push for more patenting and look to increased licensing to
raise revenue. Third, the norms in academia could be shifting because of
the generational change in researchers. As Professor Mark Lemley noted,
the real danger with a change in norms is not that existing scientists’
norms will change but that the new hires will have different norms.328
Indeed, those norms can shape apparent changing tenure standards,
which consider or encourage commercialization activities by researchers.
Indeed, Professor Brian Love found that,
[F]ifty-one percent of respondents believe that patenting activities
are taken into account in tenure decisions, as well as in decisions to
promote faculty members to the rank of full professor or to an en-
dowed chair. Another thirty-eight percent report that they believe
patent activities are taken into account by university administrators
when determining professors’ annual raises. In narrative responses,
several respondents additionally reported that university administra-
tors award professors who patent often with the best lab space and
extended periods of paid leave.
As a result, relatively junior professors have a strong incentive to
file patent applications, regardless of their personal views on
whether doing so would otherwise be in their own or society’s best
interest.329
These factors could all lead to increased patenting and licensing and an
incentive to either engage in more litigation or license to those who are
more willing to litigate.
B. CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE EFF AND RICHARD EPSTEIN
In late 2016, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) started its Re-
claim Invention program.330 The Reclaim Invention program is primarily
directed at prohibiting universities from licensing inventions, particularly
publicly funded inventions, to patent trolls.331 The EFF basically defines
326. Joel Achenbach & Lena H. Sun, Trump Budget Seeks Huge Cuts to Science and
Medical Research, Disease Prevention, WASH. POST (May 23, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2017/05/22/trump-budget-seeks-huge-
cuts-to-disease-prevention-and-medical-research-departments/?utm_term=.1d7a49d97b58
[https://perma.cc/G46X-H45M].
327. WALTER D. VALDIVIA, UNIVERSITY START-UPS: CRITICAL FOR IMPROVING TECH-
NOLOGY TRANSFER 9 (2013), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
Valdivia_Tech-Transfer_v29_No-Embargo.pdf [https://perma.cc/TL53-BXRR] (“[W]ith
84% [of] universities operating technology transfer in the red, 2012 was a good year be-
cause over the last 20 years, on average, 87% did not break even.”).
328. Lemley, Trolls, supra note 5, at 620–21.
329. Love, supra note 228, at 330–31 (footnotes omitted).
330. About Reclaim Invention, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/re-
claim-invention/about [https://perma.cc/KR84-FK3M] (last visited Mar. 5, 2018).
331. Id.
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trolls as non-practicing entities, which definitely includes patent assertion
entities; however, it appears that they would not include universities
within the group of so-called trolls.332 The Reclaim Invention program
has two prongs.333 The first prong is an attempt to get stakeholders at
universities to sign a patent pledge to essentially pressure universities not
to license to trolls.334 The Public Interest Patent Pledge provides,
[School name] pledges not to knowingly license or sell the rights of
inventions, research, or innovation made possible by this institution
to patent assertion entities, or patent trolls.
When determining what parties to sell or license patents to,
[School name] will take appropriate steps to research the past prac-
tices of potential buyers or licensees and favor parties whose busi-
ness practices are designed to benefit society through
commercialization and invention. We will strive to ensure that any
company we sell or license patents to does not have a history of liti-
gation that resembles patent trolling. Instead, we will partner with
those who are actively working to bring new technologies and ideas
to market, particularly in the areas of technology that those patents
inhabit.335
The Public Interest Patent Pledge covers not only entities that may fall
within the category of “patent assertion entities[ ] or patent trolls,” but it
also includes those that “have a history of litigation that resembles patent
trolling.”336 The latter broadly encompasses entities that may engage in
some invention or commercialization but who also litigate patents.337
The second prong concerns an attempt to persuade state legislatures to
adopt model state legislation that basically “[r]equire[s] state-funded uni-
versities to adopt a policy not to license or sell patents to trolls . . . [and]
[v]oid[s] the sale of any university patent to a troll.”338 The model legisla-
tion states, in relevant part:
(b) In order to be eligible to receive student financial assistance or
state research funding, [State-funded university system(s)] must–
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Public Interest Patent Pledge, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/
reclaim-invention/pledge [https://perma.cc/V283-38F9] (last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Legislation: Reclaim Invention Act, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://
www.eff.org/reclaim-invention/legislation [https://perma.cc/VT6A-PBKA] (last visited Feb.
14, 2018). The Model Act contains a preamble that states:
The inventions developed at publicly funded universities represent the trust
of the public in the form of donations, grants, government funding, and tui-
tion fees. Public universities should ensure that their patent assets are man-
aged in a way that serves their educational and public interest missions.
University research should fuel the creation of new products, new services,
and new jobs. It should never become a tax on the innovation and investment
of others.
See Reclaim Invention Act (Model Act, 2016), https://www.eff.org/files/2016/09/19/
reclaiminventionact-091.txt [https://perma.cc/E9HL-AMXX].
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(1) adopt a policy relating to inventions, patents, patent assertion,
and technology transfer that demonstrates that the university is com-
mitted to ensuring that patent assets are managed in a way that
serves the public interest. To further this goal, the policy must re-
quire the university to:
(A) determine whether a patent is the most effective way to bring a
new invention to a broad user base before filing for a patent that
covers that invention; (B) research the past practices of potential
patent buyers or licensees; (C) prioritize technology transfer that de-
velops its inventions and scales their potential user base; (D) en-
deavor to nurture startups that will create new jobs, products, and
services; (E) endeavor to assign and license patents only to entities
that require such licenses for active commercialization efforts or fur-
ther research and development; (F) foster agreements and relation-
ships that include the sharing of know-how and practical experience
to maximize the value of the assignment or license of the corre-
sponding patents; and (G) prioritize the public interest in all patent
assertions and patent transactions.
(2) not assign or exclusively license any Patent to any Patent Asser-
tion Entity; and
(3) any assignment of a Patent from [State-funded university system]
to a Patent Assertion Entity shall be considered void and
unenforceable.339
Notably, the model legislation includes definitions of “patent,” “patent
assertion,” and “patent assertion entity.”340 A “‘patent assertion entity’
means any entity whose primary business model is based on patent asser-
tion or otherwise using patents to obtain licensing fees from practicing
companies.”341 Notably, the legislation includes a provision preventing
the university from receiving financial assistance for students. It is not
tied only to government funding for research. Moreover, while the legis-
lation seems to be directed at “state-funded university system,” it con-
ceivably could be read to include a university that receives some state
funding. A legislator in the state of Maryland has introduced the model
act in the Maryland legislature.342 The Act appears to have been
339. Reclaim Invention Act, supra note 338.
340. The definition of “‘Patent’ includes any issued patent or patent application, includ-
ing but not limited to a design patent or design registration, from any jurisdiction.” Id. The
definition of
“Patent Assertion” means either: (i) asserting (including but not limited to
via a written or oral demand) a claim of Infringement of a Patent for the
primary purpose of deriving royalties or other monetary compensation under
such Patent, or (ii) the commencement or subsequent pursuit of a claim, ac-
tion or proceeding in a judicial, administrative or other governmental body
based on a claim of Infringement of such Patent.
Id.
341. Id.
342. Kerry Sheehan, One Step Closer to Reclaiming University Innovation from Trolls,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.: DEEPLINKS BLOG (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2017/03/were-one-step-closer-reclaiming-university-innovation-trolls [https://
perma.cc/F7AP-3F3K].
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withdrawn.343
The EFF’s Reclaim Invention program has been critiqued by noted
property rights scholar Richard Epstein.344 In an article in Forbes, Profes-
sor Epstein critiques the EFF for failing to cite any empirical evidence
that universities are “misbehaving” with respect to managing their patent
portfolios and faults the EFF for not analyzing how current university
patent policies are problematic.345 Notably, the EFF cited Professor Feld-
man and Ewing’s study cited infra for support that universities are en-
gaged in some relationship with patent trolls. Importantly, Professor
Epstein points to the benefits of technology transfer in producing new
innovations and jobs.346 Professor Epstein makes several additional criti-
ques. First, he takes issue with the EFF’s failure to define who exactly is a
troll by stating that the EFF conflates all NPEs with patent trolls.347 Sec-
ond, he makes a specialization argument.348 He points out that universi-
ties may not have expertise in licensing patents and NPEs may assist
them.349 In particular, he points to the benefits of bundling patents with
unclear boundaries in portfolios.350 Third, he makes the argument that
the EFF has erred by essentially stating all patent enforcement is negative
in this context.351 Particularly, he points to the benefit of enforcement of
patents that make them more valuable to universities, which leads to in-
creased “willingness of universities to invest in innovative technology
[and t]hat higher productivity in turn increases the return to the public
funders, to students and to private donors, all of whom benefit from this
situation.”352 He finally states that, if anything, patents are too weak.353
Professor Feldman and Tom Ewing, whose paper was cited by the EFF,
have studied mass aggregators, such as Intellectual Ventures, who some
label as a patent troll.354 Notably, Intellectual Ventures licenses inven-
tions from universities.355 For example, “[t]he company has announced
that it has relationships with some 400 universities.”356 The identity of
those institutions is unclear because “the company may simply receive an
exclusive license to commercialize the intellectual property involved,
343. H.B. 1357, Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2017), http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frm
Main.aspx?pid=billpage&stab=01&id=hb1357&tab=subject3&ys=2017RS [https://
perma.cc/FV2K-8N4Z].
344. Richard Epstein, The Electronic Frontier Foundation Misfires on University Pat-
ents, FORBES (Nov. 4, 2016, 10:34 AM), www.forbes.com/sites/richardepstein/2016/11/04/
the-electronic-frontier-foundation-misfires-on-university-patents/amp/ [https://perma.cc/
B6N9-2SKX].
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Feldman & Ewing, Giants, supra note 50, at 14–71.
355. Id. at 38.
356. Id.
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which would not necessarily appear as a recorded transfer of owner-
ship.”357 The authors also note that recording of ownership may be
delayed for strategic reasons.358 However, almost 50 universities appear
to have some “deal” with Intellectual Ventures.359 Notably, the authors
state that Intellectual Ventures appears to have entered into deals with
universities in developing countries providing Intellectual Ventures with
the rights to file Patent Cooperation Treaty patent applications outside
the home country of the university in exchange for revenue sharing.360
Notably, funding sources for Intellectual Ventures include “the William
and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the University of Pennsylvania, the Uni-
versity of Notre Dame, [and] Grinnell College.”361 Moreover, Intellectual
Ventures uses third parties to litigate patent cases, a practice known as
privateering.362 These third parties tend to be “more aggressive” liti-
gators.363 It is unclear whether Intellectual Ventures is using these third
parties to litigate portfolios or patents that include university patents or
government-funded patents. Professor Feldman and Ewing state that,
“By signing up universities, research labs, and inventors, Intellectual Ven-
tures has optioned future patentable ideas prior to their conception.”364
Additionally, the GAO reported that “[s]ome [surveyed patent monetiza-
tion entities] told us that they acquired patents from a variety of sellers,
such as universities [and others].”365
The evolving role of the university in the context of changing norms
also raises greater concerns about the future of litigation as universities
move closer to for-profit corporations. Professor Lee points to the over-
arching public purpose of universities to explain their special treatment
under laws principally designed for for-profit corporations operating in
markets. Professor Ghosh explains the “challenges as the [American uni-
versity] navigates the pulls of commercialization and the demands of the
many constituencies it serves.”366 He points to the range of goals a uni-
versity may attempt to serve from those that are “purely private” to
“purely public.”367 Moreover, he presents several idealized versions of
the university while noting the development of land-grant institutions,
which had a focus on “practical training for citizens of the newly recog-
nized states.”368 His principle insight is that “[t]he special rules for uni-
versities represent legislative compromises that rest in part on an
idealized view of universities and on the real politics of law-making in a
357. Id.
358. Id. at 22.
359. Id. at 38.
360. Id. at 39–40.
361. Id. at 44.
362. Id. at 62.
363. Id. at 63.
364. Id. at 113.
365. 2013 GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 19.
366. Ghosh, supra note 298, at 673.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 674–75.
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world of university-industry collaboration.”369 Importantly, the interests
that represent the technology transfer community, as well as the industry,
are powerful lobbyists when joined with universities. Notably, the con-
cern with funding will continue to drive universities toward seeking either
new revenue sources or revitalizing existing funding sources. This will
drive them closer to the industry by aligning their interests and may result
in more overall litigation and perhaps less reticence to engage in
litigation.
V. THE DATA AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
We construct our dataset from a number of sources. The first, and most
important, is the Stanford Nonpracticing Entity (SNE) dataset described
above, which contains data on 10,820 cases and the 21,497 patents associ-
ated with them (although there are many duplicates for patents associ-
ated with several cases). It also contains data on where and when the
cases were filed, the patent owner at the time of litigation, and the rele-
vant dates and docket entries, as well as other information associated
with the cases.
The SNE allows us to look at cases and patents associated with univer-
sities, foundations, non-profits, or government agencies because it pro-
vides a categorization as described above. It also provides crucial data on
the nature of these cases, which we use to pursue our analysis. Moreover,
we match this dataset with other publicly available data from the USPTO,
especially as it relates to government interests in the patent and the
names of original and current assignees (when different from patent own-
ers at time of litigation). However, the USPTO data is, in certain places,
incomplete. We therefore further match the previous two data sources
with data from Google Patents. Google has made available on its website
a collection of useful data on most U.S. patents, including the number of
claims and citation to and by the patent, among others. To obtain this
data, we scrape the Google Patents website using patent numbers to au-
tomatically extract data on assignees (original and “current,” where avail-
able), patent grant dates, number of claims, and citations to and from the
patent, as well as government interest in the patent. The latter is possible
because by law patents that benefitted from government funding must
state the public investment in the description of the patent.370 Finally, we
complement all this data with publicly available information on which
universities are private and land-grant colleges, as well as the size of their
endowment.
The procedure for matching the data is described below. The following
sections describe the data and the findings.
369. Id. at 673.
370. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(6) (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(f)(4).
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A. METHODOLOGY
For the purposes of this study, we create two separate datasets: one for
patents and one for cases. This is because some of the variables of interest
relate to the patents (e.g., number of claims, citations, and the type of
university or foundation), while others are specific to the cases (such as
venue where the case was filed or number of patents asserted). Many
patents will appear in more than one case so we keep our analysis sepa-
rate for clarity.
1. Patents Dataset
In order to match the data and arrive at our dataset of interest, we give
priority to the SNE dataset, followed then by the USPTO and other data
sources. This is because neither source is complete—there are a few ob-
servations missing in each case; we strive, however, to maintain the origi-
nal categorization of the data done by Stanford.
We begin with the SNE data for patents and exclude all patents that do
not fit under categories two (university heritage or tie) and six (univer-
sity, government, or non-profit). There are 334 patents in this category.
Some of these patents are not associated with a university or foundation;
rather, they were asserted together with one or more university- or foun-
dation-related patents. We identify 52 patents that were in fact owned by
another type of organization classified as co-plaintiffs in a case also in-
volving a university or foundation. We remove these cases from the
dataset, leaving us with 282 patents.
Furthermore, this does not include all university-related patents in the
dataset; the original categorization had, in some instances, missed some
of the patents. For instance, patent US5281731 was involved in a case in
the SNE sample; it is categorized as relating to a product company (cate-
gory eight). However, according to our additional datasets the patent is
associated with the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, which was
both the original assignee and the owner at the time the case was filed
(2009), before expiring in 2012.371
We therefore complement the SNE dataset with two other sources of
data on patent assignees, using the name to look for universities, founda-
tions, and nonprofits. From the USPTO we obtain a dataset on original
assignees, which contains all U.S. patents since 1976. However, for some
patents (2,631) the data on assignees is missing; in order to look for these
cases, we scrape Google Patents for the remaining observations. We also
scrape Google Patents for data on “current assignees.” A list of name
tags we search for can be found in the Appendix; these were chosen from
a list of universities and foundations from the World Intellectual Property
371. There are a number of reasons for the few discrepancies in the SNE Dataset on the
one hand and UPSTO and Google Patent Dataset on the other, including subsequent
changes. It is important to note that the Stanford researchers did an exemplary job in
categorizing a significant amount of data. We are in no way criticizing their excellent work.
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Organization.372 Following this procedure, we identify 256 patents from
the USPTO assignee dataset, 6 additional patents from the “original as-
signee” data from Google Patents, and 19 additional patents from the
current assignee data on Google Patents. Merging these datasets with the
282 observations from the SNE dataset, and removing duplicates, we ob-
tained a total sample of 381 patents.
2. Cases Dataset
Our second dataset is comprised of all the cases involving one of the
381 patents identified above. The SNE dataset contains 585 such cases.373
It contains information on patent owners, venue of the filing, the number
of alleged infringers, relevant dates, and docket entries.
For both of these datasets, we add a number of patent-specific informa-
tion. We use USPTO data on government interest in the development of
the patent to categorize each patent and each case associated with it as
“with government interest” or “without government interest.” Further-
more, we categorize universities as public or private and land-grant ver-
sus non-land-grant.374 We also subdivide them into four categories based
on the type of organization: U.S.-based university organization, which in-
cludes both universities and their affiliated organizations; foreign-based
university organization; U.S. government agency; and foreign govern-
ment agency. Finally, we collect data on university endowment size, when
available.375
B. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The majority of the patents in our sample are associated with U.S.-
based universities (see Table 1); there are also a large number of foreign
foundations, non-profits, and research centers (non-university related).
The average patent was involved in 4.5 cases; this is slightly lower than
the overall average for the SNE dataset, which was 4.97 cases. However,
when looking exclusively at U.S.-based universities, the average is almost
the same (4.96).
We define patent “age” as the years since it was granted as of May
2017. The average patent in our sample is 14.6 years old (see Table 1 for a
breakdown). On average, patents were 7.5 years old at the time of litiga-
tion.376 Thus, the average patent in the dataset is relatively young, which
may demonstrate that, on average, there is less likely an ex post situation
372. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., PCT ANNEX INFORMATION, http://
www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/pressroom/en/documents/
pr_2015_774_annexes.pdf#page=3) [https://perma.cc/54G5-34AZ] (last visited Feb. 15,
2018).
373. The number of cases may change because of changes concerning joinder under the
America Invents Act.
374. See Members, supra note 167.
375. See ENDOWMENT VALUE, supra note 170.
376. In some cases (around ten), patents were litigated before grant date (usually be-
tween filing and grant). In these cases we categorized them as zeros.
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where a university may be asserting a patent against a technology that has
been commercialized. However, on closer examination beyond the aver-
age, there seem to be some patents that are being asserted relatively late
in their term in individual cases.
FIGURE 1
FIGURE 2
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FIGURE 3
As demonstrated by Figure 3 above, there are numerous patents liti-
gated by U.S.-based universities that are in the final few years of term.
This is similar to the results recognized by Professor Love. However,
there is only slight overlap between cases filed by universities in the East-
ern District of Texas and our “late-term patents.”
Table 1–Patent characteristics
Average
Number of number of Average
patents cases patent age
U.S.-based university 252 (66%) 4.96 15.0
Foreign university 33 (9%) 3.39 12.8
U.S.-based foundation 35 (9%) 4.34 13.7
Foreign foundation 58 (15%) 3.29 13.9
U.S. gov’t agency 1 (0%) 1 19.3
Foreign gov’t agency 2 (1%) 5 18.0
The majority of patents associated with universities relate to private
institutions (56%), while about 11% relate to foreign universities. Among
patents associated with U.S.-based institutions, over a third are land-
grant universities (see Table 3). Interestingly, 26% of all cases filed in this
jurisdiction are U.S.-based foundations or non-profits, followed by for-
eign universities (25%), foreign foundations (15%), and only 7% among
U.S.-based universities.
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Table 2–Private vs public university-related patents
Absolute
number Percentage
Private university 158 56%
Public university 94 33%
Foreign university 31 11%
Table 3–Land-grant institutions
Absolute
number
(patents) Percentage
Land grant 93 37%
Not land grant 159 63%
Table 4–Government interest (U.S. Based)
Absolute
number Percentage
Government interest 129 45%
No government interest 158 55%
Among U.S.-based patents, almost half have a government interest.
This is spread across several agencies, including the National Institutes of
Health (33% of the total), NASA (23%), the National Science Founda-
tion (6%), and DARPA (4%).
Another important variable is the venue in which the case was filed.
The four venues with the most cases are the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware (D. Del.) (15% of all cases), the United
States District Cout for the Southern District of California (S.D. Cal.)
(13.2%), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas (E.D. Texas) (11.5%), and the United States District Court for the
Central District of California (C.D. Cal.) (10.3%). The cases filed in the
Eastern District of Texas are especially interesting given that, as indicated
supra, filing in this jurisdiction might be an indicator of troll-like behav-
ior. The percentage in our sample filing in the Eastern District of Texas is
slightly lower than in the overall SNE sample where that number is
16.5%. Almost half the cases (46%) filing in that jurisdiction were U.S.-
based universities (with one-third of those being cases filed by the Cali-
fornia Institute of Technology), followed by foreign universities (22%).
Prior studies focused on university litigation have also found a large num-
ber of cases filed in the Eastern District of Texas.
In terms of the length of litigation, the average case in our sample
lasted about 2.3 years. Interestingly, the length is shorter for U.S.-based
universities (2.2 years) and foreign foundations or non-profits (1.6 years)
but longer for foreign universities (2.5 years) and U.S.-based foundations
and non-profits (3.4 years). For comparison, the length of litigation
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among patents filing in the Eastern District of Texas is 1.8 years. Thus, by
average, the length of cases is somewhat similar between our dataset and
those cases filed in the Eastern District of Texas.
C. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
In this section, we focus on what our data tells us about the behavior of
universities and foundations vis-a`-vis litigation; in particular, we investi-
gate whether the characteristics of the patents and the cases they are in-
volved in are suggestive of more aggressive patent assertion often
associated with NPEs.
We approach this question from two angles: first, by looking at mea-
sures of patent “value”; then, we explore variables pertaining to the liti-
gation cases to explore evidence of strategic behavior. There is strong
evidence that patent characteristics are associated with higher litigation
rates and might therefore be categorized as NPEs. We use our dataset to
compare our results to previous work and better understand what kinds
of organizations are associated with higher value patents. We begin by
looking at each patent’s number of claims, forward citations (citations
made to the patent by subsequent patents referring to it as prior art), and
“backward citations” (citations made to prior patents). We compare our
findings to the analysis carried out by Allison, Lemley, and Walker in
2009.377 These authors compared the value measures described above be-
tween a sample of patents that have been litigated eight or more times in
the period between 2000 and 2007, which they call “Most Litigated Pat-
ents,” and another sample of patents with some similar characteristics
that have only been litigated once (“Once litigated patents”).378 They
find statistically significant differences in the number of claims and cita-
tions between the two samples, suggesting these measures can be predic-
tive of aggressive patent assertion behavior.379 The values for these three
variables in our sample are presented below and compared to the values
obtained by Allison, Lemley, and Walker.380
377. Extreme Value, supra note 66, at 12.
378. See generally id.
379. Id.
380. Allison, Lemley, and Walker also looked at other factors, including number of
continuations. Id. at 13.
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Table 5–Comparison to Most Litigated Patents
(Allison, Lemley, and Walker 2009)
Average Average number Average number
number of of forward of backward
claims citations citations
University and foundation/non-profits sample
Mean 34.4 100.3 42.8
Median 29 101 43
Standard deviation 22.4 59.7 25.4
Allison, Lemley, and Walker (2009) Most Litigated Patents
Mean 39.3 32.3 61.5
Median 22.5 15.5 12
Standard deviation 44.7 42.4 109.31
Bivariate comparison
Significant difference? No Yes Yes
We estimate whether there are statistically significant differences
between these figures between the two samples. Finding no statistically
significant difference would indicate that the patents in our sample have a
similar value to the most litigated patents studied by Allison, Lemley, and
Walker. We find mixed results: there is no statistically significant
difference in the number of claims; if anything, the median (the value that
characterizes the middle of the distribution such that half of all values lie
under it) is higher in our sample. When it comes to forward citations, the
number is much higher for our patents than for the Most Litigated
Patents, and the difference is statistically significant; however, this is
probably a misleading statistic given that the data come from different
sources (our source is Google Patents, which might be presenting
information differently than the traditional USPTO service).381 Finally,
backward citations, that is, citations made by the patent to other patents
as prior art, is higher in the Most Litigated Patents compared to those in
our sample, and this difference is statistically significant. However, when
compared to the Once Litigated Patents in Allison, Lemley, and Walker,
the number of backward citations is also higher in a statistically
significant way. In other words, when it comes to backward citations, the
average patent in our sample is below the Most Litigated Patents but
above the Once Litigated Patents, which Allison, Lemley, and Walker
consider “‘ordinary’ litigated patents.” In sum, there is some evidence
that the patents in our sample share some of the value attributes that
381. Another point raised by Allison et al. is that this kind of forward citation should be
normalized to account for patent age (since older patents would naturally tend to have
been cited more), following Hall, Jaffe, and Tajtenmberg. However, since it is not clear we
are comparing similar measures, we do not present this normalized version.
2018] Monitoring Behavior 565
characterize highly litigated patents.382
In some ways, this should not be surprising. Notably, at least with
universities, the patents at issue were likely vetted substantially. A faculty
researcher likely obtained a research grant based on a proposal
investigating the state of the art reviewed by knowledgeable researchers.
The faculty researcher likely recognized the state of the art and filed an
invention disclosure for an invention that the faculty researcher believed
was novel and nonobvious. The invention disclosure may be reviewed by
an internal committee in the university to determine whether to seek a
patent. The technology transfer office may review the patent as well. An
attorney will be selected to work on the patent application. Finally, the
decision to litigate may be based on an evaluation of the likelihood of
success. Thus, the patented technology may be well-researched and
deserving of a patent.
Table 6–Comparison with non-university patents filed in E.D. Texas
Average Average number Average number
number of of forward of backward
claims citations citations
University and foundation/non-profits sample
Mean 34.4 100.3 42.8
Median 29 101 43
Standard deviation 22.4 59.7 25.4
Patents filed in E.D. Texas*
Mean 30.1 114.0 58.3
Median 22 46 18
Standard deviation 31.6 203.2 129.4
Bivariate comparison
Significant difference? Yes No Yes
* Excluding those coded as 2 and 6 in the SNE.
We further analyze the value of the patents in our data by comparing
them to a subset of the patents in the full SNE dataset, namely those filed
in the Eastern District of Texas. As described supra, these patents are
likely to have been the subjects of troll-like behavior. We therefore select
all patents associated with a case filed in that jurisdiction and, after
removing the patents coded as two (university heritage or tie) and six
(foundation, NGO, government), match them to Google Patent data on
the above measures of patent value. This comparison sample contains
1,631 patents; 93 of these cases are coded as one (acquired patents), four
382. It should be noted that while we report here “statistical significance,” this does not
say much about whether the differences, or lack thereof, are “significant” in practice; in
other words, the statistical tests cannot tell us whether the difference of 18.7 backward
citations between our two samples means that the patents associated with universities/
NGOs/governments are indeed much less valuable than the Most Litigated Patents studied
by Allison, Lemley, and Walker.
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(corporate heritage), or five (individual investor-started company), which
the Stanford Project indicates are typically known as patent-trolls by
those who use the term. Table 6 above presents the comparison for the
values of claims and total number of backward citations. The total
number of claims is slightly higher in the universities/NGOs/governments
sample; this is significant at the 95% confidence level. The opposite is
true for the number of backward citations, with patents filed in the
Eastern District of Texas having on average 15.5 more backward citations
(again significant at the 95% confidence level). Finally, although the
number of forward citations is slightly higher among patents filed in the
Eastern District of Texas, the difference is not statistically significant. We
take this as evidence that the value of patents associated with universities,
foundations, and governments is somewhat similar to that of patents that
have a higher likelihood of belonging to entities with the most litigated
patents in the Allison, Lemley, and Walker study.
How do these values break down by type of organization and patent?
There are small differences; however, none of them are statistically
significant, as shown in Table 7.
Table 7–Patent value by organization type*
Average Average number Average number
number of of forward of backward
claims citations citations
U.S.-based universities 36.4 (22.0) 99.5 (60.0) 41.5 (25.7)
Foreign universities 35.0 (20.0) 90.7 (62.6) 43.2 (21.9)
U.S. foundation 37.0 (24.3) 106.6 (57.4) 48.4 (32.1)
Foreign foundation 30.1 (21.8) 105.9 (63.0) 41.8 (27.5)
Total 34.4 (22.4) 100.3 (60.0) 42.8 (25.4)
* In parentheses we report the standard deviations. None of the differences between types
are statistically significant.
Finally, the measures of patent values are remarkably similar across
different types of universities (excluding ANDA cases, looking only at
U.S.-based universities and land-grant or private institutions).
Table 8–Patent value by university type*
Average Average number Average number
number of of forward of backward
claims citations citations
All universities 36.3 (21.8) 97.4 (59.8) 41.5 (25.7)
Without ANDA cases 36.5 (27.2) 98.8 (59.1) 42.1 (25.6)
U.S.-based universities 36.4 (22.1) 99.5 (59.7) 41.6 (25.7)
Land-grant universities 36.2 (24.0) 101.5 (59.0) 36.6 (25.6)
Private universities 36.7 (21.0) 97.4 (59.8) 42.8 (25.4)
* In parentheses we report the standard deviations. None of the differences between types
are statistically significant.
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Furthermore, we explore what measures relating to the cases can tell us
about the different types of patents in our sample. A variable of interest
is the length of litigation, as shorter lengths might indicate lawsuits that
are designed to settle for less than the amount to bring the case to trial, a
proxy for troll-like behavior. We find strong differences in case length
between organizational types (see Table 9), with foreign foundations
demonstrating a much shorter average length for cases (593.1) versus, for
instance, U.S.-based universities (800.1) or, especially, U.S.-based
foundations (1261.7).383 This might be an indication that foreign
foundations were conducting more aggressive patent enforcement
compared to, for instance, U.S.-based universities.
Another valuable indicator in the cases dataset is the number of
alleged infringers; like length of litigation, it is a proxy for strategic
behavior on the part of the patent assertion entities seeking to cash out
from the litigation by suing a large number of alleged infringers. The
higher the number, the more likely the PAE was acting like a patent-troll.
Once again, we find strong differences in the average numbers between
different types of organizations; however, despite the suggestive nature of
these differences, they do not appear to be statistically significant due to a
large variance in the numbers. For comparison, among the sample of non-
university related cases filed in the Eastern District of Texas described
above, the average number of alleged infringers is 3.91—0.9 less than for
U.S.-based universities in our sample (a statistically significant difference
at the 95% confidence level).
383. This difference is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. Notice that
the figures for government agencies, both U.S. and foreign, are based on too few cases to
be informative.
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Table 9–Length of litigation (in days)
Average Median Standard Number
length length deviation of cases
U.S.-based university 800.1 714 681.3 415
Foreign university 931.3 717 1057.1 40
U.S.-based foundation 1261.7 600 1311.0 48
Foreign foundation 593.1 519 478.9 74
U.S. government agency 296 296 * 1
Foreign government agency 1399.7 1034 924.8 7
Total 827.1 651 779.5 585
* The standard deviation cannot be calculated as there is only one observation
Table 10–Number of alleged infringers
Average Median Standard Number
number number deviation of cases
U.S.-based university 4.8 2 14.8 415
Foreign university 2.3 2 2.1 40
U.S.-based foundation 2.1 2 1.3 48
Foreign foundation 3.3 3 2.5 74
U.S. government agency 4 4 * 1
Foreign government agency 4.6 1 5.2 7
Total 4.2 2 12.5 585
* The standard deviation cannot be calculated as there is only one observation
Our belief is that it is relatively dangerous to draw drastic conclusions
concerning the behavior of universities and other non-profits based on
these data. Some of this behavior could be categorized as strategic
behavior taken by a rational patent litigator. However, the data seems to
indicate that universities and non-profits are exhibiting some similar
behavior to certain categories of entities that are considered so-called
patent trolls. For the reasons given supra, we believe that universities and
other entities should continue to be carefully monitored to determine
whether they are acting similar to trolls, particularly those patents that
are publicly funded. U.S. universities, in particular, receive substantial
public benefits, whether land-grant institutions and public or not, and
should continue to act in the public interest. This monitoring and
reporting will at least make universities and other non-profits think
carefully about what decisions they make about litigating patents. At the
very least, perhaps universities and non-profits will avoid licensing to
those entities commonly believed to be trolls or bottom-feeders. Indeed,
as discussed supra, some universities have made that poor choice.
Importantly, we also found that there was very little overlap between the
litigated patents in our sample and the publicly available data released by
Intellectual Ventures concerning universities’ patents licensed by it.
Another area of specific concern involves foreign universities litigating
in the United States. As discussed supra, there are a significant number of
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these universities litigating in the United States. Notably, there is also
substantial patenting conducted by foreign universities as compared to
patenting by U.S. universities in 2016. This trend may continue.
Importantly, foreign universities may not be able to take advantage of
11th Amendment immunity; however, they also may not be limited by the
recent TC Heartland decision concerning venue. This may allow them to
continue to file in the Eastern District of Texas. They are likely not
subject to the same limitations, such as march-in rights, in the United
States as U.S. universities. It is important to note that the earlier critiques
may not apply to foreign universities though. They are unlikely to receive
the same benefits under U.S. law that U.S. universities receive. For
example, they may not receive U.S. public funding at the same level and
are likely not land-grant institutions. However, the litigation and
patenting behavior of foreign universities should be monitored and may
highlight problems in the overall U.S. patent system, as noted by scholars.
VI. CONCLUSION
In examining the confluence of two important issues, the so-called pat-
ent troll issue and university patent litigation, this paper proposes that
academics and policy makers carefully monitor the patenting behavior of
universities and other non-profits. For sure, the public has invested heav-
ily in universities through various subsidies and in specific inventions. On
one hand, an argument can be made that universities, acting as private
firms in lobbying and litigation choices, are protecting those interests. On
the other hand, universities are arguably rent-seeking, which will drive
costs up for consumers and deprive them of useful innovations. We cau-
tion that universities and non-profits should exercise care in how they
litigate and should be carefully monitored. Pressure to perform as well as
dwindling resources may push some actors to behave like so-called trolls.
As discussed supra, universities should reserve the right to control the
decision to litigate. This paper provides some evidence that universities
may be acting somewhat similarly to so-called trolls. However, more re-
search is needed to evaluate the benefits and costs of non-practicing enti-
ties, including universities. Indeed, in the context of universities, those
entities are at least developing the invention and, through operation of
the Bayh-Dole Act, the inventor will receive some revenue from com-
mercialization of that invention.
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APPENDIX
Table 11–Name tags for patent assignees*
1. “University” / “university” / “UNIVERSITY”
2. “California Institute of Technology” / “CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECH-
NOLOGY”
3. “Massachusetts Institute of Technology”
4. “College” / “COLLEGE”
5. “Trustees” / “TRUSTEES”
6. “DANMARKS TEKNISE UNIVERSITET”
7. “ISIS Innovation Limited” / “Isis Innovation”
8. “Imperial Innovations” / “IMPERIAL INNOVATIONS”
9. “Georgia Tech Research”
10. “Wisconsin Alumni Research”
11. “Cornell Research Foundation”
12. “MUSC Foundation” / “Medical University of South Carolina Foundation”
13. “Yeda Research” / “YEDA Research”
14. “South Alabama Medical Science”
15. “Yarbrough William M Foundation”
16. “Mayo Foundation”
17. “EIDGENOSSISCHE”
18. “Sloan-Kettering Institute”
19. “St Jude Children’s Research”
20. “Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial”
*The name tags are not the complete names of the organizations. This is to avoid failure to
match with correct names because of slight changes in the presentation of the name, e.g.,
“The Yarbrough William M Foundation” as opposed to “Yarbrough William M
Foundation.”
Table 12–Venues
Venue Percent
D. Del. 15.04%
S.D. Cal. 13.16%
E.D. Tex. 11.45%
C.D. Cal. 10.26%
N.D. Cal. 6.5%
D.N.J. 5.3%
S.D.N.Y. 4.62%
D. Mass. 4.1%
E.D.N.C. 2.39%
N.D. Ga. 2.39%
W.D. Ark. 2.39%
W.D. Wis. 2.05%
D. Minn. 1.71%
S.D. Iowa 1.71%
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W.D. Tex. 1.54%
M.D.N.C. 1.37%
E.D. Va. 1.2%
D. Utah 1.03%
N.D.W. Va. 1.03%
D. Md. 0.85%
M.D. Fla. 0.68%
N.D. Ill. 0.68%
W.D. Mich. 0.68%
D.N.D. 0.51%
D. Neb. 0.51%
E.D. Mich. 0.51%
E.D. Pa. 0.51%
W.D. Okla. 0.51%
D.S.C. 0.34%
E.D. Mo. 0.34%
E.D.N.Y. 0.34%
N.D. Ohio 0.34%
N.D. Tex. 0.34%
S.D. Fla. 0.34%
W.D. Pa. 0.34%
W.D. Tenn. 0.34%
D. Conn. 0.17%
D.D.C. 0.17%
D. Me. 0.17%
E.D. Ark. 0.17%
M.D. Ala. 0.17%
M.D. Pa. 0.17%
M.D. Tenn. 0.17%
N.D. Ala. 0.17%
N.D. Fla. 0.17%
N.D. Miss. 0.17%
N.D.N.Y. 0.17%
S.D. Ind. 0.17%
W.D. La. 0.17%
W.D. Va. 0.17%
W.D. Wash. 0.17%
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